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FINDING ORDER IN THE MORASS: THE THREE
REAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR PIERCING
THE CORPORATE VEIL
Jonathan Macey† & Joshua Mitts††
Few doctrines are more shrouded in mystery or litigated more often than
piercing the corporate veil.  We develop a new theoretical framework that
posits that veil piercing is done to achieve three discrete public policy goals,
each of which is consistent with economic efficiency: (1) achieving the pur-
pose of an existing statute or regulation; (2) preventing shareholders from
obtaining credit by misrepresentation; and (3) promoting the bankruptcy val-
ues of achieving the orderly, efficient resolution of a bankrupt’s estate.  We
analyze the facts of veil-piercing cases to show how the outcomes are ex-
plained by our taxonomy.  We demonstrate that a supposed justification for
veil piercing—undercapitalization—in fact rarely, if ever, provides an inde-
pendent basis for piercing the corporate veil.  Finally, we employ modern
quantitative machine learning methods never before utilized in legal scholar-
ship to analyze the full text of 9,380 judicial opinions.  We demonstrate that
our theories systematically predict veil-piercing outcomes, that the widely in-
voked rationale of “undercapitalization” of the business poorly explains these
cases, and that our theories most closely reflect the actual textual structure of
the opinions.
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INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil is shrouded in mis-
perception and confusion.  On the one hand, courts understand the
fact that the corporate form is supposed to be a juridical entity with
the characteristic of legal “personhood.”  As such, courts acknowledge
that their equitable authority to pierce the corporate veil is to be exer-
cised “reluctantly” and “cautiously.”1  Similarly, courts also recognize
that it is perfectly legitimate to create a corporation or other form of
limited liability business organization such as an LLC “for the very
purpose of escaping personal liability” for debts incurred by the
enterprise.2
Apparently inconsistent with the “limited liability” nature of the
corporate enterprise, the list of justifications for piercing the corpo-
rate veil is long, imprecise to the point of vagueness, and less than
reassuring to investors and other participants in the corporate enter-
prise interested in knowing with certainty what the limitations are on
the scope of shareholders’ personal liability for corporate acts.  For
example, veil piercing may be done where the corporation is the mere
“alter ego” of its shareholders; where the corporation is undercapital-
ized; where there is a failure to observe corporate formalities; or
where the corporate form is used to promote fraud, injustice, or
illegalities.3
In this Article we argue that there is a rational structure to the
doctrine of corporate veil piercing not only in theory but in practice
as well.  Our idea is that, despite the fact that courts are inarticulate to
the point of incoherence in their reasoning in particular “piercing”
cases, a rational taxonomy can be derived from this morass.
Our thesis is simple.  We begin with the observation that the so-
called “doctrine” of piercing the corporate is not a doctrine at all.  It is
a remedy.  Like any good remedy, of course, the corporate veil is
1 DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681, 683 (4th
Cir. 1976) (citations omitted).
2 Bartle v. Home Owners Coop., 127 N.E.2d 832, 833 (N.Y. 1955).
3 See Baatz v. Arrow Bar, 452 N.W.2d 138, 141 (S.D. 1990).
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pierced in order to achieve discrete, specific policy objectives.  As
such, our task is to discover and articulate what those policy objectives
are.  Our taxonomy consists of the list of the policy objectives that
justify ignoring the corporate form.  In the case of piercing, one rea-
son that confusion and incoherence reigns is that the corporate veil is
pierced in order to accomplish three separate and largely unrelated,
albeit legitimate, policy objectives.
The entire universe of piercing cases can be explained as judicial
efforts to remedy one of the following three problems.  While some of
these problems previously have been identified, this is the first Article
to identify all of the economic and policy problems that piercing at-
tempts to ameliorate.  It is the first to present a taxonomy that can
explain all of the decisions in this area and that can be used method-
ologically to evaluate the quality of piercing decisions.
First, courts pierce the corporate veil as a tool of statutory applica-
tion, in the sense that piercing the corporate veil is done in order to
bring corporate actors’ behavior into conformity with a particular stat-
utory scheme, such as social security or state unemployment compen-
sation schemes.  For example, as explained in detail below, sometimes
the court will ignore the corporate form in order to accomplish the
specific legislative goal of a government benefit program that distin-
guishes between owners and employees.  And of course, sometimes
the court will respect the corporate form where doing so is necessary
to reach a result that is consistent with a particular state or federal
statutory scheme.
Second, courts also pierce in order to remedy what appears to be
fraudulent conduct that does not satisfy the strict elements of com-
mon law fraud.  Specifically, courts pierce as a remedy for “construc-
tive fraud” in the contractual context.  Simply put, if a court becomes
convinced that a shareholder or other equity investor has, by words or
actions, led a counterparty to a contract to believe that an obligation is
a personal liability rather than (or in addition to) a corporate debt,
then courts sometimes will use a piercing theory to impose liability on
the individual shareholder rather than a fraud theory.  As one court
famously has observed, “[f]raud or something like it is required” to
pierce the corporate veil whether under federal, Delaware, or
Oklahoma common law.4
The third ground on which courts pierce the corporate veil that
we identify is the promotion of what we term accepted “bankruptcy
values.”  In particular, courts will disregard the corporate form in or-
der to prevent fraudulent conveyances and preferential transfers.  The
4 Mobil Oil Corp. v. Linear Films, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 260, 268 (D. Del. 1989) (empha-
sis added).
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goal of corporate bankruptcy law is to maximize the value of an insol-
vent company for the benefit of all of the creditors.5  An important
element in accomplishing this goal is to resolve the collective action
problem facing a corporation’s creditors, who in the absence of such
rules as the automatic stay, which prevents creditors from grabbing
the assets of a company after it has filed for bankruptcy, have incen-
tives to race for relief in order to get a jump on other creditors.
Similarly, of course, bankruptcy law strives to achieve an orderly
disposition of the debtors’ assets, either through corporate reorgani-
zation or liquidation.  One way that bankruptcy law achieves these
goals is by preventing shareholders from transferring corporate assets
to themselves or to particular favored creditors ahead of other credi-
tors in times of acute economic stress.  This result is accomplished in
the context of a formal bankruptcy proceeding by invoking the doc-
trine of equitable subordination as well as by the bankruptcy trustee’s
power to avoid and set aside preferential transfers and fraudulent con-
veyances.  Outside of bankruptcy (and sometimes in the context of
bankruptcy proceedings as well), the goal of eliminating opportunism
by companies in financial distress is accomplished by disregarding the
corporate form.6
All of the piercing cases can be explained as an effort to accom-
plish one of these three goals: (1) achieving the goals of a particular
regulatory or statutory scheme; (2) avoiding fraud or misrepresenta-
tion by shareholders trying to obtain credit; and (3) promoting the
bankruptcy value of eliminating favoritism among claimants to the
cash flows of a firm.
Thus it is our view that all of the standard litany for justifications
for disregarding the corporate form, which include failure to observe
corporate formalities, undercapitalization, alter ego, mere instrumen-
tality, ownership of all or most of the stock in the company, payment
of dividends, failure to pay dividends, etc., are mere proxies for one of
the three core reasons for piercing described above.
Our thesis is descriptive and empirically verifiable.  It is not di-
rectly normative, though we do make some normative observations,
and we believe that the taxonomy we develop here will facilitate the
formulation of normative judgments about the desirability of piercing
in the ways that we describe below.  We argue that veil-piercing cases,
if they are correctly decided, will only reach investors’ assets if doing
so accomplishes one of the three goals for piercing that we identify.
5 See THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 14 (2001).
6 Former dean of Harvard Law School Robert Clark was the first to recognize the
connection between piercing the corporate veil and the doctrine of equitable subordina-
tion and the law of fraudulent conveyance. See ROBERT CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 84–85
(1986).
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We demonstrate that our theory consistently explains the results
in the leading cases on piercing the veil.  Significantly, we find no
piercing cases in which a court pierces the corporate veil solely be-
cause a corporation is undercapitalized.  This finding is consistent
with the fact that legislatures permit thinly capitalized firms to engage
in business and generally do not require that companies be well-
capitalized in order to be formed.
Moreover, we find that, although courts do invoke the mantra of
undercapitalization to justify a determination to pierce the corporate
veil, we find that, in each case, there are other justifications for veil
piercing that are consistent with our taxonomy.
We test our theory systematically by applying machine learning
and automated text analysis methods to classify 9,380 federal and state
cases mentioning veil piercing or disregarding the corporate form.
We show that the three goals we have identified are a superior predic-
tor of actual veil-piercing decisions than the largely incoherent doc-
trines espoused by the courts.  We also show that undercapitalization
is actually a particularly poor predictor of veil-piercing outcomes.
Most significantly, in our view, we find that the application of topic
modeling demonstrates that the distribution of ideas in the text of
these opinions tracks our theories more or less precisely.
The confusion and incoherence of the law of piercing the corpo-
rate veil is compounded by the fact that because judges do not explic-
itly recognize these policy objectives, their justifications for piercing
the corporate veil are incoherent.  In our view, judges generally reach
the correct results in the cases they decide.  Because the judges (and
clerks) writing these decisions do not understand the theory (policy
rationale) on which their decisions are based, these results most likely
are based on simple intuition.  As a consequence of this intellectually
vapid reasoning by intuition, legal opinions are full of vague assertions
about nonsensical justifications such as “observing corporate formali-
ties” and broad generalizations such as “achieving justice.”
As one of us has observed, “in no other area are courts more
prone to decide real life disputes by characterization, epithet, and
metaphor: ‘alter ego,’  ‘instrumentality,’ ‘sham,’ ‘subterfuge,’ or
‘tool,’ to select a few,”7 rather than on carefully articulated reasons.
As Phillip Blumberg, the most prolific scholar in the piercing
space, accurately observed, the law of piercing the corporate veil is:
jurisprudence by metaphor or epithet.  It does not contribute to
legal understanding because it is an intellectual construct, divorced
from business realities . . . .  [C]ourts state that the corporate entity
7 ROBERT W. HAMILTON, JONATHAN R. MACEY & DOUGLAS K. MOLL, CASES AND MATERI-
ALS ON CORPORATIONS INCLUDING PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES 213
(2010).
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is to be disregarded because the corporation is, for example, a mere
“alter ego.”  But they do not inform us why this is so, except in very
broad terms that provide little general guidance.  As a result, we are
faced with hundreds of decisions that are irreconcilable and not en-
tirely comprehensible.  Few areas of the law have been so sharply
criticized by commentators.8
Courts, on the other hand, often appear unconcerned by the
vagueness of the doctrines they are formulating.  One court observed
that a “guiding concept behind . . . veil-piercing cases is the need for
the court to ‘avoid an over-rigid preoccupation with questions of
structure . . . and apply the preexisting and overarching principle that
liability is imposed to reach an equitable result.’”9
In Part I of our Article we explain the current state of the law and
show the analytical shortcomings of current jurisprudence.  In Part II
we present and defend our own taxonomy for explaining the cases in
light of a qualitative discussion of leading veil-piercing cases.  In
Part III we present the results of our quantitative study employing au-
tomated content analysis.  A conclusion follows.
I
THE CURRENT MORASS
A. Limited Liability and Veil-Piercing Doctrine
Analytically, the concept of limited liability is a simple, albeit
profound, implication of the basic concept in corporate law that cor-
porations (and other entities such as limited liability companies and
limited partnerships) are distinct juridical entities separate and apart
from their creditors, shareholders, directors, and other constituen-
cies.  As a consequence of this legal separateness, corporations and
similar business entities can enter into contracts; sue and be sued; be
responsible for paying taxes and complying with laws and regulations;
and internalize both the benefits and the burdens of these attributes
separate and distinct from other constituencies, including sharehold-
ers.  In other words, limited liability is an implication of the notion
that a complete separation of identities exists between investors and
the corporations in which they have invested.
To the extent that the relationship between a corporation and its
investors is purely contractual, that contract need not, and generally
does not, require that investors face personal liability to the corpora-
tion’s creditors.  Similarly, of course, the existence of this corporate
separateness implies that investors in the corporation—whether they
8 PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS IN
THE LAW OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS 8 (1983).
9 Litchfield Asset Mgmt. Corp. v. Howell, 799 A.2d. 298, 312 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002)
(quoting LiButti v. United States, 107 F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir. 1997)).
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are equity investors or debt investors—have only an attenuated rela-
tionship with the people and companies with whom the corporation
interacts.  And that relationship does not include personal responsi-
bility or liability for the debts of the corporation on the part of
investors.
Thus, limited liability derives from the concept of corporate sepa-
rateness, and corporate separateness is now firmly ingrained in our
legal culture and in the sensibilities of lawyers and investors.  This has
not always been the case.  Early corporations in the United States
often did not provide for limited liability for shareholders.10  As Mor-
ton Horwitz has observed, “truly limited shareholder liability was far
from the norm in America even as late as 1900.”11  As a theoretical
matter, the concept of complete corporate separateness was required
in order to make the idea of limited liability defensible, or at least
coherent.12
The concept of corporate separateness is now firmly ensconced
in the legal culture.  The corollary of this concept is limited liability
for shareholders.  Because the corporation is solely liable for the debts
of the corporation, it follows inexorably that others, including claim-
ants on the cash flows of the business such as shareholders, are not
personally liable for the debts that the corporation has incurred.  Lim-
ited liability is considered “the primary benefit of the corporate
form,”13 and the protections for shareholders have been described,
somewhat inaccurately, as “both unqualified and universal”14 for cor-
porations (and other entities such as limited liability companies and
limited liability partnerships) of every size, shape, and description.
Whenever a corporation is unable fully to meet its creditors’ de-
mands for payment, such creditors will find it in their interest to try to
obtain payment of the corporation’s obligations to them from other
parties, and the company’s shareholders generally are the most attrac-
tive target.  Creditors in this situation often will try to persuade a court
to pierce the corporate veil or to disregard the corporate form.
The lack of a coherent theory or workable algorithm either for
determining when the corporate veil should be pierced or for predict-
ing when it will be pierced results in a situation in which creditors lack
the disincentive to sue—and defendants lack the incentive to settle—
10 E. Merrick Dodd, The Evolution of Limited Liability in American Industry: Massachusetts,
61 HARV. L. REV. 1351, 1356 (1948).
11 Morton Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA.
L. REV. 173, 208 (1985).
12 See id. at 185–86 (discussing early theories of the corporation and the possibility of
limited liability under them).
13 Timothy P. Glynn, Beyond “Unlimiting” Shareholder Liability: Vicarious Tort Liability for
Corporate Officers, 57 VAND. L. REV. 329, 337 (2004).
14 Id. at 340.
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that clear legal rules provide.  The ostensible standards articulated by
courts to justify piercing vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and the
articulated doctrinal standards are “often characterized by ambiguity,
unpredictability, and even a seeming degree of randomness.”15
Large swaths of veil-piercing doctrine make no sense and do not
promote any sensible policy goals such as limiting opportunistic risk-
taking.  Piercing occurs sporadically, and it is difficult to predict when
piercing will occur.16  The often-articulated maxim that courts pierce
the corporate veil in order to “do justice”17 creates the erroneous im-
pression that this is an area of the law in which judges are uncon-
strained by rules and are more or less free to impose remedies that fit
their own internal views of fairness.  As Robert Clark observed in his
treatise, “the courts usually forgo any sustained attempt at a remedial
theory or even a coherent exposition of the basis of liability, although
descriptive summaries are occasionally attempted.”18  A major point of
this Article is that judges have in fact decided veil-piercing cases in a
highly disciplined and structured way when one analyzes the actual
outcomes of the cases in isolation from the reasoning displayed in the
decisions themselves.
A sure sign of the state of confusion in this area of law is the
existence of incoherent and inconsistent multifactored tests.  For ex-
ample, occasionally, a failure to pay dividends is identified as a justifi-
cation for piercing the corporate veil,19 while in other contexts the
payment of dividends is itself identified as a justification for piercing
the corporate veil.20  Obviously, both of these justifications cannot si-
15 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing Veil Piercing, 26 J. CORP. L. 479, 507 (2001).
16 See id. at 506–07; see also Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability
and the Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 89 (1985) (calling veil piercing “rare, severe, and
unprincipled”).
17 See, e.g., LFC Mktg. Grp., Inc. v. Loomis, 8 P.3d 841, 845–46 (Nev. 2000) (“[T]he
‘essence’ of [piercing the corporate veil] is to ‘do justice’ whenever it appears that the
protections provided by the corporate form are being abused.”); Kugler v. Koscot Inter-
planetary, Inc., 293 A.2d. 682, 703 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1972) (“Equity will go behind
the corporate form where necessary to do justice.” (citing Fortugno v. Hudson Manure
Co., 144 A.2d 207 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1958))); Superior Portland Cement, Inc. v.
Pac. Coast Cement Co., 205 P.2d 597, 620 (Wash. 1949) (“It is a well-recognized principle
of law that . . . the corporate veil may be pierced when necessary to do justice in particular
cases.”).
18 CLARK, supra note 6, at 72. R
19 See Riggins v. Dixie Shoring Co., 592 So. 2d 1282, 1283 (La. 1992) (Dennis, J. con-
curring in the denial of rehearing) (“Some of the many factors which may properly be
considered [in veil-piercing cases] include: . . . non-payment of dividends.”).
20 See Soroof Trading Dev. Co. v. GE Fuel Cell Sys. LLC, 842 F. Supp. 2d 502, 521
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (listing payment of dividends as a factor to be considered in determining
whether to pierce the corporate veil); Fernando M. Pinguelo & Kristen M. Welsh, Piercing
the Corporate Veil: NJ’s Expanding Application to the Limited Partnership, 26 THE CORP. COUN-
SELOR, Sept. 2011, available at http://www.sakr-law.com/CM/Articles/Piercing-Corporate-
Veil-NJs-Expanding-Application.asp (discussing a test for “dominance” to justify veil pierc-
ing including payment of dividends as a factor).
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multaneously be valid.  Among the other factors that courts claim to
consider when they pierce the corporate veil are:
• significant undercapitalization of the business entity (capitaliza-
tion requirements vary based on industry, location, and specific
company circumstances);21
• failure to observe corporate formalities in terms of behavior
and documentation;22
• intermingling of activities or assets of the corporation and of
the shareholder;23
• treatment by an individual of the assets of the corporation as
his/her own;24
• failure to pay dividends;25
• siphoning of corporate funds by the dominant shareholder(s),
through, inter alia, the payment of dividends;26
• nonfunctioning corporate officers and/or directors;27
• absence or inaccuracy of corporate records;28
• overlap of corporate records, functions, or personnel;29
• use of the corporation as a “facade” for personal dealings of the
dominant shareholder(s), the “alter ego theory”;30
21 See Robert B. Thompson, Piercing  the Veil Within Corporate Groups: Corporate Share-
holders as Mere Investors, 13 CONN. J. INT’L L. 379, 387 (1999).
22 See id.
23 See, e.g., Cancun Adventure Tours, Inc. v. Underwater Designer Co., 862 F.2d 1044,
1047–48 (4th Cir. 1988) (“[W]hen substantial ownership is combined with other factors,
such as commingling of corporate and personal assets and diversion of corporate funds to
the dominant shareholder, a court may peer behind the corporate veil.”); My Bread Bak-
ing Co. v. Cumberland Farms, Inc., 233 N.E.2d 748, 751–52 (Mass. 1968) (discussing how
the separate identities of affiliated corporations may be disregarded when “there is a con-
fused intermingling of activity of two or more corporations engaged in a common enter-
prise with substantial disregard of the separate nature of the corporate entities, or serious
ambiguity about the manner and capacity in which the various corporations and their re-
spective representatives are acting”); see also Peter B. Oh, Veil-Piercing, 89 TEX. L. REV. 81,
133 tbl.12 (2010) (reporting that fraud/misrepresentation, injustice/unfairness, domina-
tion, commingling of assets, and undercapitalization, are the most popular rationales for
veil piercing).
24 See, e.g., Cahaly v. Benistar Prop. Exch. Trust Co., 864 N.E.2d 548, 557 n.15 (Mass.
App. Ct. 2007) (“[Company] funds were used by [one of the individual defendants] to
carry out ‘his personal penchant for risky option trading on the stock market.’”).
25 See, e.g., Riggins v. Dixie Shoring Co., 592 So. 2d 1282, 1283 (La. 1992).
26 See, e.g., Keffer v. H.K. Porter Co., 872 F.2d 60, 65 (4th Cir. 1989) (listing factors
relevant to the decision to pierce the corporate veil as including, inter alia, “siphoning of
the corporation’s funds”).
27 See, e.g., id. (listing factors relevant to the decision to pierce the corporate veil as
including, inter alia, “non-functioning of officers and directors”).
28 See, e.g., Cahaly, 864 N.E.2d at 557.
29 See Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL
L. REV. 1036, 1044–45 (1991).
30 See, e.g., H.K. Porter Co., 872 F.2d at 65 (holding that “the fact that the corporation is
merely a facade for the operation of the dominant stockholder or stockholders” is relevant
to the veil-piercing decision); Galgay v. Gangloff, 677 F. Supp. 295, 298 (M.D. Pa. 1987)
(listing the alter ego doctrine as an exception to the general rule against shareholder
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• failure to maintain arm’s length relationships with related
entities;31
• use of the corporation to promote fraud, injustice, or illegali-
ties;32 and
• payment by the corporation of individual obligations.33
Among the many problems with the current approach is its fail-
ure to draw any sort of logical link between the articulated test or
factor and any discernible public policy objective.  For example, while
it often is claimed that piercing the corporate veil is required to pre-
vent fraud,34 this is not the case.  Where there is fraud, a cause of
action for fraud can be brought directly, and there is no reason to
pierce the corporate veil in order to prevent injustice.  Similarly,
where there is no fraud, it hardly makes sense to impose liability as a
means of preventing some other, unrelated fraud in the future.
Likewise, it seems nothing short of bizarre to impose liability on a
shareholder on the grounds that the corporation has not been
scrupulous about keeping minutes or other records unless there is
some connection between the sloppy or nonexistent record-keeping
and the harm to the plaintiff, which generally there is not.
Indeed, the rather popular idea of disregarding the corporate
form on the grounds that the corporation is undercapitalized is simi-
larly problematic.35  It is inconsistent with the basic concept that a
corporation can be formed for the express purpose of avoiding per-
sonal liability to impose an ex post condition on personal liability that
has nothing to do with the shareholders’ own behavior.  As a practical
matter, the lack of minimum capital requirements, and the existence
of thousands of corporations that have been formed and are being
operated for long periods of time without any capital at all, is only
consistent with the theory that capital is not required.36
liability for corporate actions); Cheatle v. Rudd’s Swimming Pool Supply Co., 360 S.E.2d
828, 831 (Va. 1987) (discussing how the corporate fiction may be disregarded if the plain-
tiff shows that the corporation was the alter ego of the individual shareholders).
31 See, e.g., My Bread Baking Co. v. Cumberland Farms, Inc., 233 N.E.2d 748, 752
(Mass. 1968).
32 See, e.g., Baatz v. Arrow Bar, 452 N.W.2d 138, 141 (S.D. 1990) (listing factors rele-
vant to the decision to pierce the corporate veil as including, inter alia, “use of the corpora-
tion to promote fraud, injustice, or illegalities”).
33 See, e.g., id. (listing factors relevant to the decision to pierce the corporate veil as
including, inter alia, “payment by the corporation of individual obligations”).
34 See, e.g., DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681,
684 (4th Cir. 1976) (discussing cases where courts have cited fraud as justification for veil
piercing).
35 See Oh, supra note 23, at 133 tbl.12 (reporting empirical findings that undercapital- R
ization is among the most popular rationales for veil piercing); Thompson, supra note 29, R
at 1063 tbl.11 (same).
36 See Bartle v. Home Owners Coop., Inc., 127 N.E.2d 832 (N.Y. 1955).
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We have found that courts do not pierce the corporate veil unless
there is a cogent policy justification for doing so.  We have identified
three such cogent policy reasons for piercing.  We recognize that
sometimes courts articulate rationales for their decisions in piercing
cases that ostensibly vary from ours.  For example, courts sometimes
defend piercing the corporate veil because a company: (a) has failed
to follow corporate formalities, (b) is the “alter ego” of its sharehold-
ers, or (c) is undercapitalized.  We find however that when one looks
beyond the ritualistic incantation of these vague talismanic mantras,
when the veil is actually pierced, invariably the real reason for doing
so is that piercing achieves one of the three policy justifications identi-
fied in this Article.
We refer to certain ostensible justifications for piercing the cor-
porate veil as “talismanic mantras” where there is no logical link or
nexus between the justification and a concrete economic rationale or
public policy justification for veil piercing.  For example, piercing the
corporate veil for failing to observe corporate formalities such as hold-
ing directors’ meetings or keeping minutes makes no sense.  It is like
imposing liability on a person because he did not wear a tie or keep a
napkin in his lap while eating.  On the other hand, where the failure
to keep records is so profound that one cannot utilize such records to
determine which assets legitimately belong to the corporation and
which legitimately belong to its shareholders, then piercing is appro-
priate to prevent the unfair and strategic abuse of creditors by unilat-
erally categorizing assets as belonging to the shareholder (and thus
unavailable to creditors) when there is no legitimate basis for doing
so.  Thus, when “failure to observe corporate formalities” is cited as a
justification for piercing, the piercing generally is done to achieve one
of the concrete policy goals articulated here, such as promoting bank-
ruptcy values or preventing “[f]raud or something like it.”37  Indeed,
as Franklin Gevurtz has noted, opportunistically establishing a corpo-
ration to exploit the benefits of a statutory scheme, i.e., to engage in a
type of statutory arbitrage, is another type of conduct that is “like”
fraud, and therefore justifies piercing even though it does not rise to
the level of classic common law fraud.38
A similar form of analysis applies for the invocation of the alter
ego doctrine.  Clearly when the activities of a corporation and its
shareholders are so intertwined that it is impossible to distinguish one
from the other, i.e., to determine where the corporation’s assets and
37 Mobil Oil Corp. v. Linear Films, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 260, 268 (D. Del. 1989).
38 See Franklin A. Gevurtz, Piercing Piercing: An Attempt to Lift the Veil of Confusion Sur-
rounding the Doctrine of Piercing the Corporate Veil, 76 OR. L. REV. 853, 905–07 (1997).  We
disagree with Gevurtz on the role of inadequate capitalization in veil-piercing doctrine,
however. See id. at 888.
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activities stop and where the shareholders’ assets and activities begin,
then piercing is required to achieve the central policy objectives of
bankruptcy law: facilitating the fair and orderly resolution of a bank-
rupt’s estate and avoiding transfers to shareholders that undermine
the legitimate, contractually determined expectations of the creditors.
Turning to the issue of undercapitalization, we first draw atten-
tion to the often-overlooked fact that piercing a corporation’s veil on
the sole grounds that the corporation is (or was) undercapitalized is
fundamentally inconsistent with two bedrock tenets of corporate law.
First, piercing the corporate veil on the grounds of undercapitaliza-
tion is inconsistent with the legislative determination that corpora-
tions can be properly formed without any capital whatsoever.  This
legislative principle is reflected in state statutes in Delaware and other
states permitting corporations to be formed without equity contribu-
tion from their founders.39
Second, piercing on the grounds that a corporation is undercapi-
talized is inconsistent with the well-known policy determination that
shareholders can form corporations for the specific purpose of avoid-
ing personal liability.40  The assertion that a corporation must main-
tain enough stockholders’ equity to satisfy the claims of creditors is
inconsistent with the notions of asset partitioning and of limiting
shareholders’ liability to the amount of their original capital contribu-
tions (if any).
B. Scholarly Attempts to Chart a Path Forward
The academic literature on piercing the corporate veil largely suf-
fers from the same analytical incoherence as the doctrine itself.  Nu-
merous scholars have attempted to make sense of the confusing and
contradictory applications found in the case law by offering various
normative and descriptive theories as well as empirical studies.  Unfor-
tunately, these important works have yet to provide a comprehensive
taxonomy that systematically explains existing case law.
In a classic treatment of the topic, Frank Easterbrook and Daniel
Fischel build on Henry Manne’s argument that limited liability facili-
39 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151 (2014); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 501 (McKinney
2014) (permitting issuance of shares without par value); Richard A. Booth, Capital Require-
ments in United States Corporation Law, in LEGAL CAPITAL IN EUROPE 620 (Marcus Lutter ed.,
2006); Luca Enriques & Jonathan R. Macey, Creditors Versus Capital Formation: The Case
Against the European Legal Capital Rules, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1165 (2001).
40 In fact, the “primary reason” for using the corporate (or LLC) form of business
organization “is to protect the owners and management from personal liability for claims
against the business.” VALERIO GIANNINI, GOVERNANCE AND RECORDS IN CLOSELY-HELD COR-
PORATIONS, available at http://riskarticles.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Governance
-and-Records-in-Closely-Held-Companies.pdf. See generally Easterbrook & Fischel, supra
note 16. R
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tates portfolio diversification by emphasizing that limited liability
serves to more efficiently allocate risk between creditors and share-
holders: rather than imposing the entirety of the monitoring, infor-
mation, and coordination costs on shareholders, limited liability
places those burdens on creditors, who are often better equipped to
bear them.41  Veil-piercing cases can be understood as judicial
recognitions of the inapplicability of this efficiency rationale in set-
tings such as close corporations (where the benefits of portfolio diver-
sification are few), parent-subsidiary corporations (no unlimited
liability for shareholders), tort creditors, and undercapitalization (to
reduce socially excessive risk-taking).42
The problem with Easterbrook and Fischel’s approach is that it
provides no clear decision rule for courts.  What is the line between a
corporation that is sufficiently closely held to warrant veil piercing
and one that is not?  Should subsidiary corporations always lack lim-
ited liability?  Courts have refused to go down those paths, opting in-
stead for multifactor tests that preserve judicial discretion.  Indeed, it
is difficult to see how any of these settings inherently tips the balance
toward excessive risk externalization toward creditors.  This suggests
that Easterbrook and Fischel’s theory provides only an ex post justifi-
cation for veil-piercing cases rather than an ex ante rule that courts
can reliably implement.  A more comprehensive account of veil-
piercing cases is necessary to understand the actual scope of the
doctrine.
In perhaps the most well-known study on piercing the corporate
veil, Robert Thompson attempted to shed light on the true scope of
the doctrine by empirically examining approximately 1,600 cases from
1930 to 1985.43  Thompson found that the empirical data did not
comport fully with theoretical intuitions.  In particular, courts were
more likely to pierce the veil when individual shareholders were in-
volved than for corporate shareholders, and courts pierced the veil
more often in contract than in tort cases.44  These findings stand in
contradiction to Easterbrook and Fischel’s theory.
Thompson’s study provides valuable insights by summarizing and
classifying the 1,600 cases in his dataset.  But there are several method-
ological shortcomings to his approach.  As others have noted, case
counting alone does not permit distinguishing which factors are more
strongly associated with an outcome than others.45  Thompson’s effort
41 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 16, at 98–101. R
42 Id. at 109–12.
43 Thompson, supra note 29, at 1036. R
44 Id. at 1068.
45 See Fred S. McChesney, Doctrinal Analysis and Statistical Modeling in Law: The Case of
Defective Incorporation, 71 WASH U. L.Q. 493, 495 (1993).
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to identify which veil-piercing rationales are mentioned by courts sheds
important light on these cases, but mentioning a rationale is not the
same as relying on it.  To merely say that something is mentioned in a
“laundry list” of factors does not provide much insight.  We build on
Thompson’s work by looking at how stated veil-piercing rationales ac-
tually influence courts, i.e., by evaluating which are systematically asso-
ciated with veil-piercing outcomes.  Thus, our study permits
determining which factors are actually driving veil-piercing decisions.
Indeed, we are not the first to attempt to determine which factors
are systematically associated with veil-piercing outcomes.  John Mathe-
son conducted an extensive empirical study using multiple logistic re-
gressions to identify which case characteristics predict a veil-piercing
outcome.46  More recently, Peter Oh examined nearly 3,000 veil-
piercing cases and found that fraud claims are the best predictor of a
piercing decision and, contrary to Thompson, concluded that tort
claims were more successful than contract claims.47  Interestingly, Oh
also found that undercapitalization rationales were mentioned at simi-
lar proportions in contract and tort cases, which makes less sense with
respect to the latter as contract creditors had the opportunity obtain
an express guarantee from the principals of an undercapitalized
firm.48
A shortcoming of all of these studies is the use of mechanical
coding to identify veil-piercing factors, which is subject to substantial
subjectivity and arbitrariness.  Coding schemes—indeed, quantitative
analysis more generally—necessarily reflect an imperfect approxima-
tion of the qualitative complexity of each case.  But using mechanical
coding to identify determinants of veil piercing is particularly impre-
cise because it places substantial discretion in the hands of human
coders, whose application of judgment can vary between individuals
and even from case to case by the same individual.
Indeed, the contradictory findings of Peter Oh and Robert
Thompson with respect to tort versus contract cases serve as a useful
case in point.  It is likely that Oh’s reclassification of many contract
cases under a new category of “fraud” is responsible for explaining
this difference, which Oh tacitly acknowledges.49  Regardless of
whether fraud falls into contract or tort as a doctrinal matter, from an
empirical standpoint this coding scheme is purely arbitrary: it reflects
the coder’s choice alone.  It is impossible to view Oh’s study as contra-
46 John H. Matheson, Why Courts Pierce: An Empirical Study of Piercing the Corporate Veil, 7
BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 1 (2010).
47 Oh, supra note 23, at 138. R
48 Id. at 135.
49 See id. at 95 (“The versatility in the characterization of Fraud claims presents a po-
tentially distortive effect on Thompson’s findings about the frequency of and rates for veil
piercing in Contract and Tort.”).
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dicting or lending support to Thompson’s because the former simply
uses a different coding scheme to classify cases than the latter.  The
coder has determined the result, not the data.
Moreover, none of these studies evaluate any theory of veil pierc-
ing.  It is true that Matheson finds statistically significant associations
between certain case characteristics and the mechanically coded dis-
cussion of various topics with a veil-piercing outcome.50  But Mathe-
son does not systematically demonstrate that one particular theory of
veil piercing is a better predictor of courts’ behavior than another.
Rather, like Thompson, he shows mere associations between veil
piercing and certain case characteristics and descriptive rationales.  In
this study, we supplement an in-depth qualitative discussion of several
leading cases with automated content analysis, which uses statistical
rules rather than arbitrary mechanical coding and systematically evalu-
ates whether our theory is a better predictor of courts’ behavior than
traditional explanations.
Indeed, we believe that our taxonomy can produce a coherent
account of veil-piercing cases, and are thus more optimistic than
Stephen Bainbridge, who famously called for the abolishment of the
doctrine.51  Unlike Bainbridge, we believe that there are strong public
policy rationales for retaining veil piercing in certain situations.  We
hesitate to conclude that a century of jurisprudence represents a co-
lossal mistake on the part of the courts in all fifty states.  Rather, we
suggest that three public policy rationales provide a systematic justifi-
cation of veil piercing and that courts regularly decide in accordance
with these rationales, even if they do not say so expressly.
II
A NEW TAXONOMY
To say that the law is confused is not to say that the corporate veil
should never be pierced.  It is only to say that the corporate veil
should never be pierced without a reason.  We believe that there are
three sensible reasons for piercing the corporate veil and that these
justifications provide a complete account of the contexts in which
courts find it appropriate to pierce the veil.  As noted in the Introduc-
tion, these reasons are: (1) achieving the goals of a particular regula-
tory or statutory scheme; (2) avoiding fraud or misrepresentation by
shareholders trying to obtain credit; and (3) promoting the bank-
ruptcy value of eliminating favoritism among claimants to the cash
flows of a firm.
50 See Matheson, supra note 46, at 4. R
51 Bainbridge, supra note 15, at 479. R
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In the following sections, we discuss each of these justifications
and present specific examples from cases found in the well-known
treatise by Stephen Presser on piercing the corporate veil.52  In addi-
tion to its greater explanatory power than current theories, our frame-
work offers two additional advantages over existing accounts of veil
piercing. First, our three-part taxonomy distinguishes between situa-
tions in which courts actually pierce the corporate veil and situations
in which the court does not ignore the legal form of a business organi-
zation but decides that certain liabilities that ostensibly are the corpo-
ration’s alone actually are the exclusive or the shared responsibility of
others, including shareholders and affiliate corporations.  This latter
category of cases, then, are not really piercing cases; rather, they are
better characterized as joint and several liability cases.  In particular,
where a court finds liability on the basis that such liability promotes
bankruptcy values, often the corporate veil of the defendant corpora-
tion is irrelevant: the relevant issue is the culpability of third parties,
whose potential liability is in addition to the liability of the other
entities.
Also, current accounts of the rationales for disregarding the cor-
porate form, particularly accounts that consider undercapitalization
as a grounds for veil piercing, fail to reconcile the basic tension be-
tween the well-settled doctrine that corporations can be established
for the very purpose of avoiding personal liability and the doctrine
that the veil can be pierced to avoid injustice.  Under our account,
corporations can be established for the sole purpose of avoiding per-
sonal or corporate liability on the part of investors but not when doing
so is inconsistent with the goals of another regulatory or statutory
scheme; when there is evidence of fraud or misrepresentation by com-
panies or individuals trying to obtain credit; or when respecting the
corporate form facilitates or enables favoritism among claimants to
the cash flows of a firm.
Throughout this discussion, we omit details of the doctrinal dif-
ferences between jurisdictions and focus on the primary rationales ar-
ticulated by the courts in reaching the outcome.  As we have already
noted, the doctrinal terms in this area of law are so fluid and flexible
that it makes little sense to distinguish between one court’s reference
to the “alter ego” theory and another court’s emphasis on a “mere
instrumentality.”  We are of the view that by examining the facts of the
cases, the courts’ holdings, and the primary rationales articulated by
the judges within the doctrinal framework that applies, one can iden-
tify the underlying theories responsible for the outcome regardless of
the terminology employed by the courts.
52 STEPHEN B. PRESSER, PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL (2013).
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A. Achieving the Purpose of a Regulatory or Statutory Scheme
1. Environmental Law
Perhaps the most straightforward theory that explains courts’ de-
cisions to pierce the corporate veil is furthering a regulatory or statu-
tory scheme whose purpose would be undermined by upholding the
corporate form.  A classic example is the well-known Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA), which authorizes intervention by the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency in the wake of environmental disasters and imposes
liability on those responsible for releasing hazardous substances into
the environment.53
Section 107(a)(3) of CERCLA imposes liability on “any person
who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or
treatment . . . of hazardous substances.”54  In Carter-Jones Lumber Co. v.
LTV Steel Co., the Sixth Circuit considered whether Harry Denune, the
sole shareholder of defendant Dixie Distributing, could be held liable
for Dixie’s portion of the damages resulting from the release of haz-
ardous polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) into the environment.55  Af-
ter initially determining that veil piercing under section 9607(a)(3)
was governed by Ohio state law,56 the Sixth Circuit imposed personal
liability on Denune, expressly holding that the corporate veil may be
pierced to further the goals of the CERCLA statutory scheme:
Congress enacted CERCLA with the intent of ensuring that those
responsible for any damage, environmental harm, or injury from
chemical poisons bear the costs of their actions.  Courts applying
state veil piercing law in conjunction with a CERCLA action must
keep this statute’s broad legislative purpose in mind. . . .  Consider,
for example, a case in which a corporation with a single shareholder
kept immaculate corporate records, observed all the formalities re-
quired by corporate law, and was adequately capitalized.  The share-
holder never commingled funds, and never held himself out as
personally liable for the corporation’s debts. . . .  Can it be that the
shareholder is immunized from personal liability if he causes the
corporation to commit an illegal act, no matter the degree of his
control over the corporation with regard to the illegal act, no mat-
ter the harm to third parties, and no matter the other equities?57
53 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (2012); 40 C.F.R. pt. 300, 302 (2013).
54 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3).
55 237 F.3d 745 (6th Cir. 2001).
56 Carter-Jones Lumber Co. v. Dixie Distributing Co., 166 F.3d 840, 847 (6th Cir.
1999) (“If the corporate veil may be pierced under Ohio law to reach Denune as the sole
shareholder, then he will be jointly and severally liable for Dixie’s share of the response
costs.”).
57 LTV Steel Co., 237 F.3d at 749 (quoting AT&T Global Info. Solutions Co. v. Union
Tank Car Co., 29 F. Supp. 2d 857, 868 (S.D. Ohio 1998)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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This excerpt depicts the Sixth Circuit, correctly in our view, expressly
disregarding various traditional elements of veil piercing—e.g., failing
to observe corporate formalities and holding oneself out as personally
liable for the corporations’ debts—in order to further the goals of the
CERCLA statutory scheme.  Consistent with the taxonomy developed
in this Article, the Sixth Circuit was unwilling to uphold limited liabil-
ity if doing so would directly undermine a regulatory scheme that spe-
cifically rendered Denune’s actions “illegal.”
Similarly, in United States v. Kaysar-Roth Corp., the First Circuit af-
firmed a lower court holding that a parent corporation may be held
liable for a subsidiary’s violation of CERCLA when the parent is “in-
volve[d] with ‘operations having to do with the leakage or disposal of
hazardous waste, or decisions about compliance with environmental
regulations.’”58 Kaysar-Roth involved a petition pursuant to Rule
60(b)(5) of relief from a 1990 declaratory judgment imposing liability
for future cleanup costs on the parent corporation, Kaysar-Roth Cor-
poration, for its subsidiary’s release of trichloroethylene at a facility.59
In Kaysar-Roth, the First Circuit relied heavily on United States v.
Bestfoods, where the Supreme Court emphasized that the mere exer-
cise of shareholder control over a corporation through activities such
as electing directors and approving bylaws is insufficient to render
those shareholders personally liable for the corporation’s violation of
CERCLA.60  Indeed, even simultaneously serving as a director or of-
ficer of both the parent and subsidiary is insufficient to automatically
attribute the actions of the latter to the former.61  Rather, “[t]he criti-
cal question is whether, in degree and detail, actions directed to the
facility by an agent of the parent alone are eccentric under accepted
norms of parental oversight of a subsidiary’s facility.”62  In this regard,
direct involvement of the parent corporation in the subsidiary’s com-
pliance with environmental regulations would be sufficient to render
the parent liable for the subsidiary’s violation of CERCLA.63  In
Kaysar-Roth, the First Circuit found that the parent corporation would
remain liable because its executive vice president “played a central
role in decisions about environmental compliance” at the subsidiary’s
facility.64
The Supreme Court’s standard in United States v. Bestfoods reflects
this first theory we have put forth for piercing the corporate veil,
58 272 F.3d 89, 102 (1st Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51,
66–67 (1998)).
59 Id. at 91.
60 Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 61–62.
61 Id. at 69.
62 Id. at 72.
63 Id.
64 Kaysar-Roth, 272 F.3d at 104.
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i.e., furthering the goals of a statutory or regulatory scheme.  When a
parent corporation becomes actively involved in a subsidiary’s compli-
ance with CERCLA, failing to pierce the veil would undercut the goal
of the statutory regime by effectively granting the parent a partial ex-
emption from the regulatory burdens the statute imposes.  The parent
would obtain the benefit of reducing the subsidiary’s compliance
costs—i.e., by shifting labor expenses from the subsidiary to the par-
ent—while confining the risk of CERCLA liability to the subsidiary.
Such “externalization” would give parent corporations an incentive to
render subpar compliance by reducing the expected loss to the parent
from CERCLA violations.  The standard set forth in Bestfoods, demand-
ing direct involvement of the parent in the subsidiary’s compliance
with environmental regulations, can thus be understood as directly
furthering the goals of the CERCLA statutory scheme.
Environmental cases where courts refused to pierce the veil simi-
larly comport with this rationale.  In Raytheon Constructors Inc. v. Asarco
Inc., the Tenth Circuit refused to impose personal liability on a share-
holder corporation whose president also served as chairman and pres-
ident of the subsidiary corporation.65  The court held that merely
having an individual serve in this dual role did not lead to the auto-
matic imposition of liability on the shareholder corporation.  Indeed,
the court emphasized that there was simply no evidence tying the
shareholder corporation to the day-to-day operations of the subsidiary
corporation’s activities.66  The justification for veil piercing found in
Bestfoods—ensuring that a parent cannot obtain the double benefit of
partial regulatory compliance by shouldering the subsidiary’s compli-
ance costs while confining enforcement risk within the subsidiary—
was simply not occurring in the facts of Raytheon Constructors.  Accord-
ingly, imposing liability on the shareholder corporation would not ad-
vance the goals of the CERCLA statutory scheme.
Similarly, in Browning-Ferris Industries of Illinois, Inc. v. Ter Maat,
the plaintiffs sued two corporations in a contribution action under
CERCLA for cleanup costs resulting from the defendants’ improper
abandonment of a landfill.67  The plaintiffs also sued Richard Ter
Maat, the president and principal shareholder of the two corporations
at the time.  One of the issues before the Seventh Circuit was whether
Ter Maat may be held liable personally for the cleanup costs under a
veil-piercing theory.  Following Bestfoods, the court concluded that
were Ter Maat to have personally “supervised the day-to-day opera-
tions of the landfill . . . he would be deemed the operator, jointly with
65 368 F.3d 1214, 1220 (10th Cir. 2003).
66 Id. at 1219–20.
67 195 F.3d 953, 954 (7th Cir. 1999).
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his companies, of the site itself” and thereby liable under CERCLA.68
The case was remanded because the district court failed to consider
this question.69
Indeed, the Seventh Circuit specifically rejected the application
of other grounds for veil piercing other than the theories we articu-
late here.  The court acknowledged that “the strongest case for pierc-
ing the veil is presented when the corporation had led potential
creditors to believe that it was more solvent than it really was,”70 which
is the second rationale—deceiving creditors—that we discuss infra.  In
Browning-Ferris, of course, there was no such misrepresentation or in-
duced reliance—the tort claimants were involuntary creditors forced
to incur the cleanup costs pursuant to CERCLA.  As a result, the court
concluded, “[T]here is no issue of protecting reliance induced by mis-
representations by the debtor.”71
Moreover, the Browning-Ferris court rejected the claim the defen-
dant corporations’ veil should be pierced because they were under-
capitalized, emphasizing that “[t]he cases in which undercapitaliza-
tion has figured in the decision to pierce the corporate veil are ones
in which the corporation had so little money that it could not and did
not actually operate its nominal business on its own.”72  The court
expressly concluded, as we argue throughout this Article, that
“[u]ndercapitalization is rarely if ever the sole factor in a decision to
pierce the corporate veil”; rather, it “is best regarded simply as a factor
helpful in identifying a corporation as a pure shell, which [the defen-
dant corporation] was not.”73  Cases involving such a “pure shell” are
encompassed by the second and third rationales we articulate infra,
i.e., avoiding shareholder misrepresentation to creditors or promot-
ing bankruptcy values.  Indeed, as the Browning-Ferris court recog-
nized, undercapitalization is an incoherent justification because no
public policy purpose (e.g., encouraging efficient investment by diver-
sified shareholders) is furthered by conditioning limited liability on a
minimal level of capital.74
2. ERISA
Section 406(b) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA) prohibits a fiduciary of a retirement plan from “receiv[ing]
any consideration for his own personal account from any party deal-
ing with such plan in connection with a transaction involving the as-
68 Id. at 956.
69 Id. at 961.
70 Id. at 959.
71 Id. at 960.
72 Id. at 961.
73 Id.
74 See id. at 960.
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sets of the plan.”75  This prohibition is intended to maximize the value
of plan assets by ensuring objectivity, i.e., the distortion of profes-
sional judgment that may result from self-dealing or transactions in-
volving conflicts of interest.76
In a leading veil-piercing ERISA case, Lowen v. Tower Asset Manage-
ment, Inc., the defendant-fiduciary Tower Asset Management invested
plan assets in entities in which it held an equity interest, which facili-
tated a series of additional transactions that yielded a profit to the
defendant.77  Such activity plainly violates the prohibition found in
section 406(b) on a fiduciary receiving personal consideration for
transactions involving plan assets.  The Second Circuit held that in
addition to Tower Asset Management, several of its shareholders may
be held liable regardless of whether they were fiduciaries in their own
right.78  The Second Circuit justified its holding by expressly discuss-
ing the need to uphold the purpose of the ERISA regulatory regime:
Neither the separate corporate status of the three corporations nor
the general principle of limited shareholder liability afford protec-
tion where exacting obeisance to the corporate form is inconsistent with
ERISA’s remedial purposes.  Parties may not use shell-game-like ma-
neuvers to shift fiduciary obligations to one legal entity while chan-
neling profits from self-dealing to a separate legal entity under their
control.79
The court continued:
The Supreme Court has ‘consistently refused to give effect to the
corporate form where it is interposed to defeat legislative poli-
cies.’ . . .  Courts have without difficulty disregarded form for sub-
stance where ERISA’s effectiveness would otherwise be
undermined. . . . A failure to disregard the corporate form in the circum-
stances of the present case would fatally undermine ERISA.80
In Lowen, upholding the corporate form would have undermined
ERISA because these shareholders likewise had an equity interest in
the entities in which Tower Asset Management invested the plan assets
in violation of section 406(b).  Furthermore, Tower Asset Manage-
ment “intermix[ed]” plan assets with these shareholders, rendering
these individuals actively involved in Tower Asset Management’s viola-
tion of section 406(b).81
75 29 U.S.C. § 1106(b) (2013).
76 See Lowen v. Tower Asset Mgmt., Inc., 829 F.2d 1209, 1213 (2d Cir. 1987) (discuss-
ing congressional concern with self-dealing by plan managers).
77 Id. at 1214.
78 Id. at 1220.
79 Id. (emphasis added).
80 Id. at 1220–21 (emphasis added).
81 See id. at 1221.
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It is essential to recognize that Lowen is a veil-piercing case be-
cause the Second Circuit did not hold that the shareholders were fidu-
ciaries independently subject to section 406(b).  Rather, liability was
imposed because failing to do so would have given Tower Asset Man-
agement an incentive to engage in self-dealing as long as it ensured
that the profits inured to a separate entity, i.e., its shareholders.82
Taken to the extreme, Tower Asset Management might be left with no
assets if they were redirected in their entirety to the shareholders, ren-
dering it impossible to collect damages on a suit for violating section
406(b) and eliminating any incentive to comply with the statutory ban
on self-dealing.  Accordingly, failing to pierce the corporate veil in
Lowen would have undermined ERISA’s goal of giving fiduciaries an
incentive to make objective investment decisions in order to maximize
the value of plan assets.
The Lowen court cited the First Circuit’s decision in Alman v.
Danin83 as an example of where “the incorporators of an inadequately
capitalized corporation were held liable for the corporation’s unpaid
contributions to various pension plans.”84  Nonetheless, a careful
reading of Alman shows that undercapitalization was not the primary
justification for the veil-piecing decision.  The controversy in Alman
involved the failure of a manufacturing company, Mohawk, to make
its weekly contributions to its employee benefit plans.85  While the
First Circuit briefly mentions that “[f]rom the outset, Mohawk was in-
adequately capitalized,” this statement comes during a lengthy discus-
sion of why piercing the corporate veil is justified:
Indeed, deferring too readily to the corporate identity may run con-
trary to the explicit purposes of [ERISA]. . . .  Congress enacted
ERISA to ensure that employees were not deprived of promised
benefits which they both expected and deserved.  To permit [the
individual defendants] to hide behind Mohawk, a paper corpora-
tion they knew was inadequately funded, and thereby avoid paying
almost $100,000 in delinquent contributions would . . . tend to de-
feat ERISA’s purposes and work a clear injustice.86
This paragraph makes it clear that undercapitalization is only the
means by which the individual defendants’ failure to pay the employ-
ees led to a situation where upholding the corporate form would have
defeated the statutory purpose of ERISA.  In this specific setting, con-
fining liability to the judgment-proof, bankrupt corporation would
have left the employees without any recovery and thus without the
82 See id. (“ERISA Section 406(b)’s prohibitions would be empty rhetoric if the corpo-
rate form might so easily shield those who profit from prohibited transactions.”).
83 801 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1986).
84 Lowen, 829 F.2d at 1220.
85 Alman, 801 F.2d at 3.
86 Id. at 3–4.
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employee benefits that ERISA was intended to ensure they would
receive.
Indeed, in ERISA cases where the court refused to pierce the veil,
this rationale was plainly lacking.  In Laborers’ Pension Fund v. Litgen
Concrete Cutting & Coring Co., the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois held that the failure of the defendant-corporation
Litgen Concrete to make contributions under the terms of a collective
bargaining agreement as required by section 145 of ERISA87 could
not give rise to personal liability by William Litgen, one of its three
shareholders who held a 40% equity interest in the firm.88  While the
court mentions the traditional doctrinal grounds for piercing the
veil—e.g., maintaining corporate records and adequate capitaliza-
tion—its ultimate justification hinges on the statutory purpose ratio-
nale shown thus far:
The plaintiffs have submitted no facts demonstrating, for example,
that William Litgen incorporated Litgen Concrete to defraud the
plaintiffs or circumvent the law. The plaintiffs also have submitted no
evidence that, were this court to hold Litgen Concrete liable, Litgen Concrete
could not pay the judgment.  Of course, were such to be the case, and
the plaintiffs established the other prerequisite for piercing Litgen
Concrete’s corporate veil, the plaintiffs could bring another action
to pierce the veil and recover from Litgen Concrete.89
While the Litgen Concrete court does not state its reasoning as elo-
quently as the First Circuit did in Lowen, the reference to Litgen Con-
crete’s ability to pay the judgment demonstrates that the underlying
rationale of furthering the goals of the ERISA statutory scheme is dis-
positive.  To be sure, we are not claiming that the mere fact that the
corporation is unable to pay the judgment is sufficient to pierce the
veil.  Rather, the failure of a judgment-proof corporation to fulfill its
ERISA obligations is often accompanied by some sort of diversion of
corporate assets by the shareholders that renders it essential to disre-
gard the corporate form to uphold the purpose of ERISA, i.e., to en-
sure that employees receive the benefits intended by the statutory
scheme.90  In Litgen Concrete, the corporation’s solvency and the ab-
sence of any such asset diversion meant that veil piercing was unneces-
sary to ensure that the corporation fulfilled its collective bargaining
contribution obligations under section 1145 of ERISA.
Similarly, in Board of Trustees v. Valley Cabinet & Manufacturing
Co.,91 the Ninth Circuit refused to pierce the corporate veil in a suit
87 29 U.S.C. § 1145 (2013).
88 709 F. Supp. 140, 143–44 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
89 Id. at 144 (emphasis added).
90 See, e.g., Alman, 801 F.2d at 4 (discussing how the defendant owners of a corpora-
tion “could not have expected [the corporation] to be able pay its debts”).
91 877 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1989).
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for unpaid collective bargaining contributions pursuant to section 451
of ERISA.92  At first glance, the facts in Valley Cabinet would seem to
support veil piercing under the rationale we have articulated thus far:
Valley Cabinet was a defunct, judgment-proof corporation, and the
controlling shareholder of the corporation—Robert Davis—borrowed
over $200,000 at the same time that the corporation failed to make
these contribution payments.  Indeed, these facts would seem well-
suited to imposing liability on Davis under the theory that failure to
pay the employee contributions would undermine the goal of ERISA’s
regulatory scheme.
In explaining its refusal to pierce the corporate veil, the Ninth
Circuit noted the district court’s finding that Davis lacked fraudulent
intent when withdrawing these funds.93  Admittedly, at first glance,
fraudulent intent may not seem relevant to furthering the purpose of
ERISA’s regulatory scheme.  However, a careful reading of the opin-
ion shows that the two are intertwined in this specific case:
There was evidence that Valley Cabinet did not believe that it owed
money to the Fund.  Valley Cabinet attempted to challenge the
withdrawal liability assessment by requesting certain information
from the Fund in 1982.  The Fund failed to answer until it partially
responded in 1985.  Furthermore, Valley Cabinet’s counsel advised
Davis that Valley Cabinet did not owe contribution payments to the
Fund, supporting an inference that Davis did not intend to defraud
the trust when he transferred corporate assets to his personal
account.94
Conduct reflecting a bona fide dispute over whether the corpora-
tion actually owes the debt under ERISA does not undermine the goal
of the regulatory scheme.  A crucial fact in Valley Cabinet is that its
collective bargaining agreement expired in June 1981, two months
prior to the termination of contribution payments in August 1981.95
Moreover, in October 1981, the board of directors voted to close the
business as of December 31, 1981.96  And when the employee fund in
Valley Cabinet demanded over $200,000 in withdrawal liability, Valley
Cabinet’s corporate counsel informed the corporation’s board of di-
rectors that it owed no money to the fund.97  Indeed, for at least ten
years prior to this period, Valley Cabinet had been making its contri-
bution payments pursuant to its collective bargaining agreements.98
Under these circumstances, it is difficult to conclude that ERISA’s
92 29 U.S.C. § 1451 (2013).
93 Valley Cabinet, 877 F.2d at 773–74.
94 Id. at 774.
95 Id. at 771.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 774.
98 Id. at 771.
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purpose would be undermined by upholding the corporate form in
the wake of a bona fide dispute over Valley Cabinet’s liability for non-
payment after the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement in
June 1981.
By way of contrast, in Lowen and Alman it was undisputed that the
shareholders’ use of corporate assets by shareholders undermined the
ERISA regulatory regime by depriving employees of the benefits in-
tended by the statue.  Indeed, there was no fraudulent intent in
Lowen, suggesting that the fraudulent intent theory emphasized by the
Ninth Circuit cannot serve as a universal justification for veil piercing.
The seemingly contradictory rationales emphasized in the aforemen-
tioned cases can be reconciled through the underlying rationale of
furthering the purpose of a regulatory scheme.  When upholding the
corporate form implies undermining a statutory framework passed by
Congress to advance specific public policy goals, courts will intervene,
regardless of the doctrinal rhetoric they employ to justify such
intervention.
B. Avoiding Misrepresentation by Shareholders
A second justification for piercing the corporate veil is to prevent
the mistaken extension of credit, i.e., by shareholders who misrepre-
sent their active involvement in the subsidiary’s affairs.  In this section,
we will discuss this creditor-protection rationale and distinguish it
from the often-mentioned “undercapitalization” theory.  It is true that
creditors are often harmed when a firm is insufficiently capitalized,
but in the contractual setting, this risk can be expressly allocated to
the corporations’ principals by obtaining a personal guarantee of the
debt.  Protecting creditors in the contractual setting thus turns on
preventing misrepresentations regarding shareholder involvement.
At the conclusion of this section, we will also discuss how this creditor-
protection rationale applies by analogy in the tort setting where the
corporation’s failure to ensure sufficient oversight escalated the
probability of imposing harm on third parties.
1. Contract Creditors
In David v. Glemby Co., the plaintiff Jean-Louis David contracted
separately with defendants Glemby Co. and its 98%-owned subsidiary
Hair Programming, Inc. to license David’s brand name and operate
Jean-Louis David hair salons in the United States.99  When HPI failed
to perform its contractual obligations, David brought suit against
Glemby as well, claiming that HPI’s corporate veil should be pierced
because the two corporations acted as one entity in the transaction.100
99 717 F. Supp. 162, 164 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
100 Id. at 164–65.  The breach of contract claims were against HPI alone. See id. (“HPI
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The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss on the veil-piercing claim,
holding that a jury could reasonably find that HPI’s corporate form
should be disregarded and liability imposed on Glemby.101  While the
court mentioned the traditional elements of veil piercing—e.g., fail-
ure to completely observe corporate formalities—the court discussed
these elements in the context of implied and express representations
by Glemby that it would perform HPI’s duties under the contract:
Letters apparently written on behalf of HPI appeared on Glemby
letterhead and referred ambiguously to “our obligation.” . . .  David
had no reason to believe HPI’s function was to avoid liability for
Glemby, especially in light of David’s allegations that “Glemby
promised Mr. David that it would take all steps necessary to see that
Hair Programming performed the obligations stated in the Market
Development Agreement, which Hair Programming signed, on in-
structions from Glemby.”102
It is apparent that the failure to observe corporate formalities that
would permit the plaintiff to distinguish Glemby from HPI justifies
disregarding HPI’s corporate form because Glemby implicitly misled
the plaintiff into extending credit on the basis of Glemby’s involve-
ment in HPI.103  Such misleading conduct does not rise to the level of
common law fraud—indeed, there is no specific false statement104—
but justifies the imposition of liability because the extension of credit
on the basis of a mistake regarding the involvement of the parent is
inefficient.
A noteworthy case piercing the corporate veil in a setting similar
to common law fraud is Mobridge Community Industries, Inc. v. Toure,
Ltd.105  In Mobridge, the plaintiff MCI sued Toure and four of its direc-
tors for breach of contract for failing to make an installment payment
for the sale of personal property.106  In imposing liability on the indi-
vidual defendants, the Supreme Court of South Dakota emphasized
the misrepresentation they made to MCI, which extended $250,000 in
credit to Toure:
The Toure financial statement exhibited by the directors to MCI
during the negotiations showed a net worth of $90,000, and a sec-
ond statement showed a net worth of $65,000.  This discrepancy was
missed the 1984 and 1985 deadlines to open three other David salons and failed to open
these salons even after obtaining an extension of the August 1985 deadline of several
months.”)
101 Id. at 167.
102 Id. at 167–68.
103 See id. (“David had no reason to believe HPI’s function was to avoid liability for
Glemby.”).
104 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1977).
105 273 N.W.2d 128 (S.D. 1978).
106 Id. at 130.
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explained as the good will factor of approximately $25,000.  At the
time the statements were exhibited to MCI, Toure had approxi-
mately $62.08 in its corporate account.107
Mobridge is striking because the court held each of the four directors
liable under a veil-piercing theory, and there is no indication in the
opinion that these directors were also shareholders, although they
may have been.108  While it might seem most natural to bring a claim
against directors under a tort theory for fraudulent misrepresentation,
the Mobridge court expressly imposed personal liability on the direc-
tors on the basis of the breach-of-contract claim against the
corporation.109
Like many piercing-the-veil cases, the Mobridge court emphasized
the relative undercapitalization of Toure in light of the contractual
activity to be undertaken.110  But this case demonstrates precisely what
we have argued throughout this Article: rather than serving as an in-
dependent justification for piercing the veil, undercapitalization
serves to buttress one or more of the three primary rationales for dis-
regarding the corporate form that we have identified.  In Mobridge, the
court imposed liability on the four directors because they misrepre-
sented Toure’s capitalization in order to obtain credit from MCI.  The
court refers specifically to the directors’ “false representations” re-
garding their “financial ability to carry out the agreement.”111  Under-
capitalization in this setting, then, constituted the factual
representation that was falsely conveyed to the contractual
counterparty in exchange for an extension of credit.  It did not serve
as an independent justification for the veil-piercing decision.
Moreover, the court specifically referred to the false misrepresen-
tations made by the directors with respect to their involvement in the
corporation’s activities, which weighed in favor of the decision to ex-
tend credit to the corporation:
The fact that [the individual defendants] were involved in the ven-
ture provided considerable credibility to the representations and
negotiations.  Further misrepresentations came in the form of a
Toure management resume which included several reputable indi-
viduals in the business community who were to join Toure manage-
107 Id. at 132.
108 Id. at 134 (“We conclude that the conduct of the directors constitutes the kind of
dealing which would make it inequitable for the trial court to recognize the corporate
entity of Toure and thus permit the individual directors to escape personal liability.”).
109 See id. (“The contract breached in this case was an obligation to pay money only
($250,000 in equal installments of $50,000, none of which was ever paid), and the trial
court finding that the amount due by the terms of the obligation was the proper measure
of damages cannot be held to be clearly erroneous.”).
110 See id. at 132 (“A further factor justifying a disregard of the corporate entity in this
case is inadequate capitalization.”).
111 Id. at 133.
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ment within a month’s time.  There were other misrepresentations
as to start-up time, worldwide patents owned or pending, availability
of molds, plant improvements, and an influx of investment
money.112
It is clear that the misrepresentation to obtain credit served as the
primary justification for the court’s decision and undercapitalization
merely served as one of the factual premises at the center of such
misrepresentation.
Indeed, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York expressly reached a similar conclusion in Oriental Commercial and
Shipping Co. v. Rosseel, N.V.113  The facts of Oriental are complex but
essentially concerned a $34 million transaction between a Belgian oil
trading corporation Rosseel and Oriental U.K., a U.K. corporation es-
tablished and held by Abdul Hamed Bokhari, who also owned Orien-
tal S.A., a Saudi Arabian corporation.114  Rosseel sought to hold
Bokhari personally liable for Oriental U.K.’s alleged breach of con-
tract, arguing that the corporate veil should be pierced because Ori-
ental U.K. was extremely undercapitalized and represented that
Bokhari and Oriental S.A. would stand behind the former’s contrac-
tual obligations.115
Oriental is notable because the court expressly discussed the two
theories we are contrasting in this section: undercapitalization per se
as opposed to misrepresentation to creditors.  While the court ac-
knowledged that undercapitalization is an “element to be consid-
ered,” it specifically held that “undercapitalization alone is not a
sufficient ground for disregarding the corporate form” and “the mere
fact that an entity may or may not have the capital to respond to a
potential large award against it does not justify piercing the corporate
veil.”116  Indeed, the court emphasized that undercapitalization is
“particularly important, where, as here, there has been a misrepresen-
tation as to the assets of the company.”117  Just as in Mobridge, the un-
dercapitalization in Oriental constituted the subject of the
misrepresentation to creditors.  The court’s express emphasis on the
inability of undercapitalization on its own to justify piercing the corpo-
rate veil is consistent with the argument we have advanced in this
Article.
112 Id.
113 702 F. Supp. 1005 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
114 Id. at 1009.
115 See id. at 1015–16 (“Rosseel is seeking to hold to the contract the principal on
whose behalf its agent was apparently acting or to pierce the corporate veil.”)
116 Id. at 1020.
117 Id.
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On the other hand, it is clear that the misrepresentation in Orien-
tal did serve as a primary justification for the court’s decision to pierce
the veil:
In sum, Bokhari represented to the world that his London office
was part of his Saudi Arabian company.  He hired an experienced
oil trader known in the industry and permitted him to distribute the
Saudia [sic] Arabian company’s promotional literature representing
that the London company is part of the Saudi Arabian company.
The representations were reasonably relied on and a large oil deal
was entered into.  After the deal collapsed, the Saudi Arabian com-
pany stated that the London office and Saudi Arabian company
were “two different entities.” . . .  Bokhari seeks the benefits of his
representation that Oriental U.K. is a branch of Oriental S.A., but
denies the liabilities.  That is fraud and the Court will not allow the
corporate form to be used for such a purpose.118
Indeed, this rationale expressly reflects the theory we have put forth
in this section, namely, preventing shareholders from obtaining credit
for the corporation by misrepresenting their personal involvement.
2. Tort Creditors
Unlike contract creditors, involuntary tort creditors present a
more challenging setting for this rationale because there is generally
no misrepresentation involved.  It is in these cases that undercapital-
ization seems to arise as the sole explanation for piercing the veil and
holding shareholders individually accountable for the corporation’s
tort liability.  However, a careful look at these situations shows that
this generally only occurs when courts seek to discourage inadequate
oversight or other forms of negligent management of the corporation.
As such conduct can impose inefficient harms on third parties, courts’
intervention can be understood under a rationale analogous to
preventing the “mistaken” extension of credit in a broader sense,
i.e., the negligent infliction of involuntary harm.
A leading case often mistakenly cited for the proposition that un-
dercapitalization alone is sufficient to pierce the veil is Minton v.
Cavaney.119  In Minton, the Seminole Hot Springs Corporation oper-
ated a public swimming pool, and the plaintiffs obtained a judgment
against Seminole for their daughter’s wrongful death by drowning in
the pool.120  The plaintiffs sought to hold Cavaney, the director, secre-
118 Id. at 1023.
119 364 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1961).  For an example of an appellate court incorrectly citing
Minton for the proposition that undercapitalization is sufficient, see Nilsson v. Louisiana
Hydrolec, 854 F.2d 1538, 1544 (9th Cir. 1988).  Presser thoroughly rejects the notion that
undercapitalization is sufficient to pierce the veil in California in PRESSER, supra note 52, R
§ 2.5.
120 Minton, 364 P.2d at 474.
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tary, and treasurer of Seminole, personally liable for the judgment.121
In imposing liability on Cavaney personally, the California Supreme
Court emphasized Seminole’s insufficient capitalization:
The equitable owners of a corporation . . . are personally liable
when they . . . provide inadequate capitalization and actively partici-
pate in the conduct of corporate affairs.  In the instant case the evi-
dence is undisputed that there was no attempt to provide adequate
capitalization.  Seminole never had any substantial assets.  It leased
the pool that it operated, and the lease was forfeited for failure to
pay the rent.  Its capital was “trifling compared with the business to
be done and the risks of loss.”122
Despite the Minton court’s rhetorical emphasis on undercapitaliza-
tion, this was not the only deficiency in Seminole’s conduct as a corpo-
ration.  Specifically, the court emphasized that “section 800 of the
Corporations Code provides that ‘. . . the business and affairs of every
corporation shall be controlled by, a board of not less than three di-
rectors.’ . . .  A person may not in this manner divorce the responsibili-
ties of a director from the statutory duties and powers of that
office.”123
Seminole’s failure to comply with an express statutory mandate
provides a much more compelling basis to disregard the corporate
form because it suggests inadequate oversight of the corporation.  Inade-
quate oversight (i.e., by a board of directors that is smaller than the
statutory minimum) can increase the probability that the corporation
will act in a socially harmful manner.124  Were Seminole to have been
subject to a larger board of directors and conducted its affairs in ac-
cordance with the statutory requirements, perhaps it would have
taken greater care in preventing drowning in the swimming pool,
i.e., by posting a lifeguard.  The Minton court’s emphasis on failure to
observe formalities should be understood as reflecting a refusal to up-
hold limited liability when the corporation is operated in a manner
that is significantly likely to impose harm on others and thereby
render them involuntary tort creditors of the firm.
Indeed, as Judge Frank Easterbrook observed in Secon Service
System, Inc. v. St. Joseph Bank & Trust Co.:
[I]t is a lot harder to hold investors personally liable in contract
disputes than for tort judgments.  The reason is simple: contract
creditors have entered into a voluntary arrangement with the corpo-
ration, which gave them an opportunity to negotiate terms reflect-
121 Id.
122 Id. at 475 (citations omitted).
123 Id. at 475–76.
124 Cf. id. at 477 (Schauer, J., concurring and dissenting) (“[A] corporation cannot
properly be regarded as organized and ready to even begin carrying on business until at
least . . . directors and officers [are] elected.”).
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ing any enhanced risk to which doing business with an entity
enjoying limited liability exposed them.  If they wanted guarantees
from the investors, they could have negotiated for them.  Tort credi-
tors had no chance to obtain compensation ex ante for exposure to
increased risk, so to cut off all liability might encourage excessively
risky behavior.125
As support for his conclusion that veil piercing in the tort setting has a
risk-reduction purpose, Easterbrook cited the Fifth Circuit’s decision
in United States v. Jon-T Chemicals, Inc.126  Jon-T Chemicals concerned a
tort suit by the U.S. government for fraudulent misrepresentation and
conversion against defendants John H. Thomas; Jon-T Farms, an
Oklahoma corporation; and Jon-T Farms’ parent firm, Jon-T Chemi-
cals.127  Jon-T Farms and Thomas were criminally convicted in a prior
proceeding, and the government sought to hold Jon-T Chemicals lia-
ble under a veil-piercing theory for the judgment against its subsidi-
ary, Jon-T Farms.128
In explaining its decision to pierce the corporate veil, the Fifth
Circuit emphasized that while “in contract cases, fraud is an essential
element of an alter ego finding[,] . . . we do not require a finding of
fraud in tort cases, particularly where the subsidiary is undercapital-
ized.”129  But as with Minton, the court’s rhetorical emphasis on under-
capitalization belies the true rationale for holding the parent
responsible.  The court’s justification makes it clear:
To mention just some of the evidence supporting the district court’s
alter ego holding, all of the directors and officers of Farms served as
directors and officers of Chemicals; Farms was wholly owned by
Chemicals; Chemicals paid many of the bills, invoices, and expenses
of Farms; it covered Farms’s overdrafts; it made substantial loans to
Farms (at one time amounting to $7 million) without corporate resolutions
authorizing the loans and without demanding any collateral or interest ;
Chemicals and Farms filed consolidated financial statements and
tax returns; Farms used the offices and computer of Chemicals with-
out paying any rent; the salary of Farms’s one regular employee was
paid by Chemicals; and employees of Chemicals performed services for
Farms without charging for their time.  Chemicals also advanced money
and provided services on an informal basis to the joint ventures.130
The emphasized text suggests that what was really motivating the
court’s holding was the concern that the casual manner in which the
parent-subsidiary relationship was managed increased the likelihood
125 855 F.2d 406, 413–14 (7th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted).
126 768 F.2d 686 (5th Cir. 1985).
127 See id. at 688.
128 See id.
129 Id. at 692–93 (citations omitted).
130 Id. at 695 (emphasis added).
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that the subsidiary would impose inefficient harms on third parties.
As with Minton, the judicial search for the “legitimacy” of the subsidi-
ary’s corporate existence finds its expression in specific actions of in-
sufficient oversight that instrumentally justify piercing the corporate
veil.  The “alter ego” finding is not a metaphysical recognition of a
unified parent-subsidiary identity but rather a rhetorical device that
courts employ to justify discouraging management of the corporation
that is likely to be socially harmful.
C. Bankruptcy Values
The goal of bankruptcy is to resolve the problems of insolvency in
the most efficient way possible in order to preserve or dispose of the
assets of the insolvent company or individual in the most efficient con-
figuration possible, thereby maximizing the value of the firm for the
creditors who are the residual claimants of companies that are insol-
vent.131  Among the most important factors in assuring a fair and effi-
cient bankruptcy process are respecting the contractual and legal
priorities of the various claimants and eschewing costly and duplica-
tive individual creditor remedies in favor of a single coordinated pro-
cess involving all of the various claimants to the insolvent firm’s
assets.132
One of the primary ways that the doctrine of piercing the corpo-
rate veil is utilized is to protect against efforts to undermine the integ-
rity of the bankruptcy process, particularly by controlling shareholders
who may try various maneuvers on the eve of bankruptcy in order to
benefit themselves at the expense of other claimants who are more
deserving by dint of their contractual, common law, or statutory
rights.
An example of bankruptcy values being furthered by the invoca-
tion of the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil is Stone v. Eacho.133
In Stone, the Delaware corporation Tip Top Tailors and its Virginia
subsidiary by the same name were placed into bankruptcy proceedings
upon becoming insolvent.134  The Delaware parent operated eight
stores across the country, including the Virginia subsidiary, which was
managed in a manner virtually identical to the other seven stores.
The books and records of the Virginia subsidiary were maintained at
the Delaware corporation, and the latter also handled the receipt of
money into the subsidiary’s treasury, the execution of contracts by the
subsidiary, and the subsidiary’s payment of wages to its employees.135
131 JACKSON, supra note 5, at 17. R
132 See id. at 16.
133 127 F.2d 284 (4th Cir. 1942).
134 Id. at 286.
135 Id.
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In Stone, the Fourth Circuit pierced the corporate veil, holding
that the assets of the parent should be available to fulfill claims by
creditors of the subsidiary.136  But unlike the cases described in sec-
tion II.B.1, there was no suggestion that either the parent or subsidi-
ary engaged in any express or implied misrepresentation to creditors
of either entity.  Not only were the elements of common law fraud
missing, there was simply no factual misrepresentation of the sort that
would justify veil piercing to minimize the inefficient allocation of
credit mistakenly extended as a result of a misrepresentation.
Rather, in Stone, the court pointed to a different rationale for
piercing the corporate veil: furthering the efficiency and fairness of
the bankruptcy proceeding.137  Once both the parent and subsidiary
had reached the point of insolvency, it would be inefficient and in-
equitable to arbitrarily prefer creditors of the parent to those of the
subsidiary by restricting each to the assets of the respective corporate
entity.  In the court’s own words:
[W]here both corporations are insolvent, where the business has
been transacted by and the credit extended to the parent corpora-
tion, and where the subsidiary has no real existence whatever, there
is no reason why the courts should not face the realities of the situa-
tion and ignore the subsidiary for all purposes, allowing the credi-
tors of both corporations to share equally in the pooled assets. . . .
Perhaps the fairest way of dealing with the situation when both the
parent and the subsidiary corporations are insolvent is to let all the
creditors of each share pro rata in the pooled assets of both.  Such
procedure would be especially equitable where the claimants are
creditors of both the parent and the subsidiary.138
The fairness rationale to this holding seems relatively straightforward:
there is no reason to arbitrarily prefer one set of creditors over an-
other when both find themselves in the unfortunate position of col-
lecting only cents on the dollar as a result of an unsuccessful
extension of credit.  The efficiency rationale, however, might seem
less clear at first glance: one might wonder why a creditor of the sub-
sidiary could not have simply demanded a guarantee by the parent
had the creditor wished to satisfy a judgment from the parent’s assets
in an insolvency proceeding.139  Why should the parent’s creditors
“pay” for the subsidiary creditors’ failure to obtain an intrafirm guar-
antee?  And subsidiaries could always obtain the opposite result by
136 Id. at 288.
137 See id. at 289 (“[I]n justice to all creditors, the corporate entity should be ignored.”
(emphasis added)).
138 Id. at 288 (internal quotation marks omitted).
139 Cf. Secon Serv. Sys., Inc. v. St. Joseph Bank & Trust Co., 855 F.2d 406, 413–14 (7th
Cir. 1988) (“If [creditors] wanted guarantees from the investors, they could have negoti-
ated for them.”).
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contract, suggesting that the only question is whether a default rule of
consolidated liability is more optimal.  But sophisticated, repeat con-
tractors such as creditors are likely to be relatively unaffected by a
default rule.
We suggest that where creditors of the subsidiary are aware of the
parent’s coordination of the subsidiary’s business activities, it is highly
likely that the extension of credit solely to the subsidiary reflects a
mistake, the correction of which promotes an efficient outcome by
more accurately reflecting creditors’ ex ante intent.  To this end, the
court in Stone noted:
There is nothing in the record before us to show that any of the
creditors who filed claims in the bankruptcy proceedings of the Vir-
ginia corporation intended to extend credit particularly to that cor-
poration; and the fact that the bills of the Richmond store were paid
by the Delaware corporation from its Newark office would indicate
that it must have been generally known to the creditors of the Rich-
mond store that it was the Delaware corporation that was there en-
gaged in business.140
In addition, piercing the corporate veil in this setting promotes
efficiency from the standpoint of the bankruptcy process.  When both
the parent and subsidiary have reached the point of insolvency, the
legal system has an interest in reducing unnecessary, duplicative costs
inherent in conducting parallel procedures to uphold the corporate
identity of each of the subsidiaries.  The Stone court expressly empha-
sized this rationale by concluding that “where the court decides that
the corporate entity of the subsidiary should be completely ignored
and its assets and liabilities treated as those of the parent corporation,
it is both logical and convenient that this be done in one proceed-
ing.”141  These substantive (credit-extending) and procedural ratio-
nales explain the tendency of courts to pierce the corporate veil in the
bankruptcy setting.
In the years following Stone, bankruptcy law developed the doc-
trine of “substantive consolidation,” which pools the assets of separate
debtors to satisfy creditor claims when “creditors dealt with the enti-
ties as a single economic unit and ‘did not rely on their separate iden-
tity in extending credit’” or “the affairs of the debtors are so
entangled that consolidation will benefit all creditors.”142  In essence,
then, substantive consolidation is simply an application of veil pierc-
ing that is animated by this rationale of protecting creditors and ob-
140 Stone, 127 F.2d at 287.
141 Id. at 289.
142 In re Augie/Restivo Baking Co., 860 F.2d 515, 518 (2d Cir. 1988) (citations
omitted).
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taining procedural benefits rather than preventing misrepresentation
or furthering a statutory scheme.
A leading case demonstrating the limits of substantive consolida-
tion—and thus veil piercing in the bankruptcy setting—is In re Augie/
Restivo Baking Co.143  In Augie/Restivo, the Second Circuit refused to
consolidate claims against two debtors who had exchanged stock as
part of a contemplated merger, but one of the entities remained a
shell corporation that held real property assets and continued to ob-
tain credit despite the operating activities residing in the other en-
tity.144  The Second Circuit emphasized that substantive consolidation
should proceed from the default rule that creditors are capable of
conditioning an extension of credit on obtaining cross-firm or in-
terfirm guarantees:
[C]reditors who make loans on the basis of the financial status of a
separate entity expect to be able to look to the assets of their partic-
ular borrower for satisfaction of that loan.  Such lenders structure
their loans according to their expectations regarding that borrower
and do not anticipate either having the assets of a more sound com-
pany available in the case of insolvency or having the creditors of a
less sound debtor compete for the borrower’s assets.145
However, the court emphasized, there was express evidence that some
of the creditors knew they were dealing with separate entities.146
Moreover, in the absence of strong procedural justifications for con-
solidating the entities, the mere possibility that a consolidated pro-
ceeding would benefit creditors is insufficient:
Where . . . creditors . . . knowingly made loans to separate entities
and no irremediable commingling of assets has occurred, a creditor
cannot be made to sacrifice the priority of its claims against its
debtor by fiat based on the bankruptcy court’s speculation that it
knows the creditor’s interests better than does the creditor itself.
The rationale of the bankruptcy judge in the instant case would al-
low consolidation of two completely unrelated companies upon a
finding that the creditors would be better off under some proposed
plan involving the joint sale of their assets.147
143 Id.
144 Id. at 517.
145 Id. at 518–19.  It is worth noting that reasoning by reference to creditors’ “expecta-
tions” is circular because the law determines what those expectations are.  Nonetheless,
there are more analytically sound justifications for a default rule of limited liability such as
encouraging portfolio diversification. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 16. R
146 860 F.2d at 519 (“It is undisputed that Union’s loans to Augie’s were based solely
upon Augie’s financial condition, and that, at the time the loans were made, Union had no
knowledge of the negotiations between Augie’s and Restivo.  MHTC also operated on the
assumption that it was dealing with separate entities. . . .  Given these circumstances, the
fact that the trade creditors may have believed that they were dealing with a single entity
does not justify consolidation.”).
147 Id. at 520.
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Piercing the corporate veil in the bankruptcy setting through substan-
tive consolidation necessitates demonstrating either a likelihood of a
mistake on the part of a creditor in extending credit to only one of
the entities or that consolidation would substantially promote effi-
ciency in the bankruptcy process from a procedural standpoint.148
A recent example of the conditions for veil piercing being pre-
sent in the bankruptcy setting is In re Brentwood Golf Club, LLC.149  In
Brentwood, Barrie and Farrell Moore managed and held equity inter-
ests in two limited liability companies: a golf club, Brentwood Golf
Club, and a tavern which operated at that golf club, Brentwood Tav-
ern.150  The tavern enjoyed a below-market lease from the golf club,
and Barrie Moore served as manager of both entities.151  Indeed, the
two entities “did not keep organized or separate financial records,”
and “Barrie Moore made the decisions, on a check by check basis,” as
to which entity expense would be applied.152
When the golf club filed for bankruptcy protection, the trustee
sought to pierce the corporate veil and substantively consolidate the
assets of the tavern with the golf club to satisfy the latter’s creditors.153
The bankruptcy court granted the trustee’s request, emphasizing that
“the two business [sic] are inextricably intertwined and all of the cor-
porate formalities have been disregarded” because they share assets,
employees, and creditors.154  It is notable that the court emphasized
the twin aspects of the bankruptcy-values rationale that we have advo-
cated in this section, preventing undermining of the bankruptcy pro-
cess or directly furthering the aims of the process itself.155  As for the
interfirm creditor mistake theory, the court concluded that the tight
intertwining of the two entities led to “a presumption that creditors
have not relied on the separate credit of each of the entities
involved.”156
Moreover, from the standpoint of the bankruptcy proceeding,
consolidation would create value for all creditors involved:
Tavern has failed to identify any specific creditor whose interest will
not be served by consolidation.  In fact, none of Tavern’s creditors,
other than the Moores who are insiders, have objected to substan-
tive consolidation. . . .  In this case, substantive consolidation is
148 See id. at 518.
149 329 B.R. 802 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2005).
150 Id. at 805.
151 Id. at 806.
152 Id. at 807.
153 Id. at 808.
154 Id. at 809.
155 See id. at 812 (“[T]he prima facie case [for substantive consolidation] is established
upon: (1) a showing of ‘substantial identity’ . . . ; and (2) substantive consolidation is
necessary to avoid a harm or produce a benefit for the estate.”).
156 Id. at 813.
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appropriate . . . because “the affairs of the debtors are so entangled
that consolidation will benefit all creditors.”157
In short, promoting bankruptcy values—the maximization of creditor
value ex post from a procedural standpoint—is a third compelling ra-
tionale for piercing the corporate veil.
III
EMPIRICAL STUDY
In this Part, we test our proposed theoretical framework with an
empirical study of 9,380 judicial opinions.  We find that the three
theories we articulate systematically predict veil-piercing outcomes;
undercapitalization poorly explains these cases; and our three-part
taxonomy most closely reflects the textual “structure” of veil-piercing
cases, which, as we will explain, is the groups of words and phrases
reflecting the underlying ideas found in the opinions.  Before discuss-
ing our findings in detail, we first explain the unique empirical meth-
odology we employ.158
A. Empirical Method: Text Analysis for Structure Discovery
We employ a technique called text analysis159 to test our theory.
Text analysis measures the extent to which specific words
157 Id. at 813–14.
158 In this Part, we refrain from using technical terms typically utilized in machine
learning such as “training set,” “loss functions,” and so forth, but the reader who is familiar
with these concepts will recognize their expression through simpler, more intuitive
terminology.
159 Empirical studies of law and legal institutions typically use the method of causal
inference.  While the precise design can vary from study to study, the basic approach is to
articulate a theory of expected behavior in response to some intervention, such as a pro-
posed regulation, and then to evaluate whether the intervention produces, on average, the
expected outcome in an observed sample drawn from a larger population of interest.  For
example, one might evaluate whether informing consumers of empirically unexpected
contract terms through a “warning box” leads to greater understanding of those terms as
measured by a post-contracting quiz. See Joshua Mitts, How Much Mandatory Disclosure Is
Effective? (Working Paper, 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abs
tract_id=2404526.  If consumers exposed to the warning box have 10% more correct an-
swers on average, one can conclude that the average benefit of the regulatory intervention
is approximately 10%.
The fundamental requirement for a valid empirical study employing causal inference
is conditional independence with respect to the intervention of interest such as the regulatory
policy. See JOSHUA D. ANGRIST & JO¨RN-STEFFEN PISCHKE, MOSTLY HARMLESS ECONOMETRICS:
AN EMPIRICIST’S COMPANION 15 (2009).  Put simply, conditional independence means that
the intervention is independent of every characteristic of units in the sample being studied,
i.e., there is no systematic link between the intervention and some other attribute of the
units in the sample.  The requirement to achieve conditional independence poses a high
hurdle for studies that merely observe interventions as they occur in the “real world”
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(i.e., undercapitalization or fraud), or the absence of such words in a
legal opinion or other document, increases the probability of an out-
come occurring (i.e., a holding that the corporate veil should be
pierced in a particular case).  We do not mean to imply or to suggest
that the mere presence of one specific word or phrase in a document
is independently—regardless of any other content in the document—
because policies are generally distributed in society in a nonrandom manner, i.e., on the
basis of some other characteristic of the individuals involved.
To take a simple example, government policies are often targeted to poor individuals,
i.e., distributed on the basis of income.  As a result, it is impossible to identify the effect of
the policies merely by comparing outcomes (e.g., education, crime, etc.) between recipi-
ents and nonrecipients of the policies: the former group differs systematically from the
latter by income.  It is thus impossible to “disentangle” the effect of income and the effect
of the policy, i.e., one cannot determine whether any differences are due to the policy,
income, or both.  This is also known as “selection bias” or “omitted variables bias”: receipt
of the policy is confounded by some other “omitted” characteristic which individuals are
“selected” upon, i.e., income.
While multiple regression analysis can attempt to isolate the causal effect of an inter-
vention by adjusting estimates by the effect of other characteristics such as income, multi-
ple regression is inadequate when there are unobserved differences between the two groups
at the basis of the comparison.  Government policies that are available by choice, i.e., on an
opt-in basis, predominantly feature this shortcoming: individuals who opt-in to receive the
policy are likely to systematically differ from those who opt-out in many unobserved ways.
For example, an individual’s choice to attend college may reflect some inherent, unob-
served drive or determination that those who do not attend college lack.  Accordingly, it is
impossible to attribute different outcomes (i.e., income levels) between college graduates
and those lacking a college degree to higher education itself: the differences may instead
be simply due to some unobserved difference between individuals in the population who
choose to attend college and those who do not.  Put differently, if there were some other way
to measure this inherent drive or determination, one could “control” for its effect and
obtain a better estimate of the true payoff of higher education.  But since no such data are
available, it is impossible to isolate the effect of a college education merely by observing
different outcomes between the two groups.
The only certain remedy for “omitted variables bias” is to employ randomization.  As
Michael Abramowicz, Ian Ayres, and Yair Listokin have emphasized, random assignment of
a policy to individuals in a population facilitates obtaining conditional independence on
average.  Michael Abramowicz, Ian Ayres & Yair Listokin, Randomizing Law, 159 U. PA. L.
REV. 929, 935 (2011).  One can attribute differences in outcomes between the “treatment”
and “control” groups to the intervention because randomization ensures that assignment
of the treatment will be uncorrelated with some other unobserved characteristic of units in
the sample.  Abramowicz, Ayres, and Listokin have called for policymakers to produce
“randomization impact statements” to provide nonconfounded estimates of the payoffs of
regulatory policy. Id. at 937.
However, despite the essential importance of causal inference to empirical research
and legal policymaking more generally, not every empirical study necessarily evaluates a
causal theory.  Some theories do not attempt to make conditionally independent predic-
tions of the average effect of an intervention in a population.  Rather, they are inherently
predictive in nature: they suggest that the presence or absence of certain factors increases
the probability of a particular outcome, without claiming that those factors are necessarily
“responsible” for the outcome in a conditionally independent, causal sense.  Predictive
findings can be important for policymaking because they describe what is presently work-
ing or not working, and indeed what is likely to work in the future when certain conditions
are present, even though they cannot identify which factors are specifically responsible for
the outcome.
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responsible for increasing the probability of an outcome occurring.160
Rather this analysis assumes that words and phrases occur in joint
combinations that reflect underlying ideas—rationales and justifica-
tions for an outcome expressed through coherent groups of related
words and phrases.161
We refer to these underlying ideas and the associated groups of
related words and phrases as the “textual structure” of the judicial
opinions.  The goal of text analysis is to discover this structure, i.e., to
identify the distinct ideas that are associated with an outcome and the
words and phrases that constitute those ideas.  To take an illustrative
example, imagine that we applied text analysis to the following ficti-
tious restaurant reviews in Table 1.162  To simplify, assume that each
restaurant receives either a “good” or “bad” score (indicated above
the fictitious review), and we wish to identify the ideas associated with
a “good” restaurant and the related words and phrases most tightly
associated with these ideas:
One of the most common applications of predictive analysis is medicine: doctors fre-
quently identify “risk factors” for certain diseases without being able to precisely identify
the causal effect of each factor.  It is known that high blood cholesterol, high blood pres-
sure, diabetes, obesity, smoking, lack of physical activity, an unhealthy diet, and stress,
jointly increase the probability of coronary heart disease—the number one killer of adults
in the United States, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NAT’L HEART, LUNG, &
BLOOD INST., What Are Coronary Heart Disease Risk Factors?, http://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/
health/health-topics/topics/hd/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2014)—but it is impossible to say
with certainty how much any one of these factors, conditionally independent of the others,
increases the risk of heart disease.  Nonetheless, these risk factors are featured predomi-
nantly in public health campaigns and form the basis of medical advice given to millions of
Americans.  Empirical evidence showing a link between these factors and heart disease
does support a theory that something about one’s lifestyle increases the likelihood of heart
disease, even if it is impossible to disentangle the contribution of each of these predictors
from the others.
160 The only exception might be words that are actually direct indicators of the out-
come, such as “affirmed” or “denied,” and even then a causal interpretation might prove
problematic because these words generally do not always indicate the outcome.
161 Even if one postulates that some underlying idea is consistently responsible for a
particular outcome in a causal sense, one cannot directly measure that idea other than
through the words through which it is expressed—and these words are inherently joint
predictors of an outcome, just as risk factors for heart disease are joint predictors of a heart
attack.  For a more detailed discussion of the predictive analysis we employ as contrasted
with traditional methods of causal inference, see the Appendix to this Article.
162 This example is loosely based on the “we8there” restaurant reviews found in Denis
D. Maua´ & Fabio G. Cozman, Representing and Classifying User Reviews, in ENIA ’09: VIII
ENCONTRO NACIONAL DE INTELIGEˆNCIA ARTIFICIAL, BRAZIL (2009).
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TABLE 1. RESTAURANT REVIEW EXAMPLE OF TEXT ANALYSIS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Good Good Bad Good Bad
“The food was “The chef came “While the “The food was “Even though the
awesome and the to greet us restaurant had a awesome, even chef came to
chef came to personally, and nice atmosphere, though we had to greet us
greet us the restaurant the service was ask several times personally, the
personally.” had such a nice terrible.  We had for drinks.” service was
atmosphere.” to ask several terrible.”
times for drinks.”
In these examples, certain phrases are tightly associated with the
restaurant score and others less so.  For example, the phrase “food was
awesome” only appears in reviews of good restaurants (1 and 4) and
“service was terrible” only appears in reviews of bad restaurants (3 and
5).  The phrase “nice atmosphere,” however, is associated with one
good (2) and one bad (3) restaurant.  At a simple level, text analysis
permits distinguishing highly predictive phrases like “food was
awesome” from those that are more ambiguous like “nice
atmosphere.”  We will show in this Part that the words and phrases
associated with our three-part taxonomy are more akin to “food was
awesome”—i.e., highly predictive of veil-piercing decisions—and
undercapitalization is more akin to “nice atmosphere,” i.e., not a very
strong predictor of judicial outcomes.
But text analysis permits more than identifying the predictive
power of specific words and phrases.  One could rightfully critique the
foregoing example for merely showing that some words are relatively
better than others, not that a certain set of words best describes the
reasoning in veil-piercing opinions, as we have argued in the prior
Part.  However, text analysis also facilitates discovering the underlying
ideas that give rise to groups of words and phrases, enabling a natural
division of the text into conceptual categories such as the three-part
taxonomy we proposed in the prior Part.
By “idea,” we mean a coherent notion that is a more meaningful
and interpretable predictor of an outcome than isolated words and
phrases.  In this fictitious example, one can intuitively identify two
underlying ideas associated with “good” or “bad” restaurants: food
quality and service quality.  A more complete analysis of the textual
structure of these reviews would identify these two core ideas and the
words and phrases that more specifically reflect those ideas in the text
of the restaurant reviews.
A common method by which text analysis performs such
“structure discovery” is based on co-occurrence, i.e., the simple
assumption that words and phrases that occur together are likely to be
related.  In this fictitious example, the phrase “chef came to greet us
personally” occurs with “food was awesome” in the review of
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restaurant (1).  One could conclude, then, that “chef came to greet us
personally” is related conceptually to the same idea as “food was
awesome”—i.e., food quality.163  However, this association is weak
because the phrases only co-occur in one restaurant review.  On the
other hand, the phrase “ask several times for drinks” appears twice
with “service was terrible,” suggesting that these two phrases are more
strongly related and reflect the same underlying idea, i.e., service
quality.
Textual structure, therefore, consists of two dimensions:
predictive power with respect to veil-piercing decisions and strength
of association as measured by co-occurrence across opinions.  This can
be represented visually as follows:
FIGURE 1. VISUAL REPRESENTATION OF DOCUMENT STRUCTURE
Association with Veil-Piercing Outcome
Co-occurrence
Across Opinions
The goal of structure discovery is to identify the words and phrases
found in the upper-right corner of this figure, i.e., those that are both
most predictive of the veil-piercing outcome and tightly related to the
same underlying idea(s).  In this Part, we apply text analysis to show
that our three-part taxonomy best describes the structure of veil-pierc-
ing opinions, i.e., the words and phrase found in the upper-right cor-
ner correspond more or less to the three rationales we discussed.
Indeed, we will also show that undercapitalization lies in the bot-
tom-left corner: it is both weakly associated with veil-piercing out-
comes and poorly linked to an underlying idea reflecting a coherent
group of associated words and phrases.  Crucially, we are not claiming
that veil-piercing decisions do not refer to inadequate capitalization.
Indeed, as the qualitative examples in Part II indicate, judges fre-
quently offer undercapitalization as one among a litany of reasons to
163 This association holds even though “chef came to greet us personally” has less
predictive power than “food was awesome” because the former is associated with one bad
restaurant (5) in addition to two good restaurants (1 and 2).
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piece the veil.  We will show, however, that notwithstanding the fre-
quency with which this term is invoked, undercapitalization is an in-
ferior way to understand veil-piercing opinions because it does not
best reflect the textual structure of the reasoning found in these
opinions.164
Our methodology improves on prior empirical studies of piercing
the corporate veil not only by moving beyond merely counting the
words and phrases that courts invoke in their opinions, but also by
analyzing the internal structure of the entire text of these opinions
using quantitative, objective statistical techniques.  This analysis
reveals that the internal structure of a large sample of cases is consis-
tent with our three-justifications-for-veil-piercing hypothesis.165  Signif-
icantly, our approach is more replicable and objective than prior
empirical studies on veil piercing because we analyze the full text of
the opinions rather than employ subjective coding of case
characteristics.
The design of our study consists of four stages, which we summa-
rize visually as follows:
FIGURE 2. EMPIRICAL DESIGN
Code Random
Sample
Predict Dataset
and Verify
Accuracy
Regress
Outcome on
Text
Discover Latent
Ideas in Text
We explain each of these phases and present results in the following
sections.
164 Indeed, the goal of our empirical project is not to determine simply which words
and phrases predict judicial outcomes—and certainly not to claim that any specific word,
phrase, or group of the foregoing has a causal (i.e., conditionally independent) effect on
the outcome—but rather that the predictive power of words and phrases reveals a natural,
“latent” structure that is consistent with our three-justifications-for-veil-piercing hypothesis.
By “latent” structure, we mean a taxonomy that is not immediately evident upon observing
a particular case, but one that is revealed by examining the mathematical and statistical
properties of the text of these opinions taken together.
165 We are not aware of any other study that has employed the entirety of the textual
analysis methods we utilize here, although an article has applied a subset of the techniques
that we employ here.  Daniel Young uses algorithmic topic modeling to analyze 19,000
pages of newspaper text from the nineteenth century and finds empirical support for
Bruce Ackerman’s argument that constitutional change outside the amendment process
can occur when there is significant popular attention to constitutional questions.  Daniel
Taylor Young, Note, How Do You Measure a Constitutional Moment? Using Algorithmic Topic
Modeling to Evaluate Bruce Ackerman’s Theory of Constitutional Change, 122 YALE L.J. 1990
(2013).
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B. Classifying the Random Sample
We obtained 9,380 judicial opinions by searching across federal
and state cases referring to either piercing the corporate veil or disre-
garding the corporate form.166  As a first step, we classify a random
sample of 1,000 cases into three groups: (1) cases where the court
pierced the corporate veil; (2) cases where the court refused to pierce
the corporate veil; and (3) cases that contain language commonly
found in piercing-the-corporate-veil or disregarding-the-corporate-
form cases but do not actually apply this remedy.167
As we noted previously, prior empirical studies on veil piercing
have utilized mechanical coding of case characteristics, i.e., whether a
judge utilized a particular rationale such as fraud or undercapitaliza-
tion, in addition to coding case outcomes.168  There is a crucial differ-
ence between the two, however: outcomes are often objective, certain,
and verifiable (i.e., whether a court pierced the veil in a particular
case).  Case characteristics are much more subjective, as it is generally
impossible to determine whether a decision merely mentioned and
discussed a particular rationale or whether the court actually based its
decision on it.  Moreover, reducing the complexity of the textual con-
tent of a judicial decision to a limited sequence of case characteristics
permits only a very “rough” hypothesis test, whereby the validity of
one’s argument depends entirely on whether the subjective coding
scheme is accurate.  For these reasons and others, mechanical coding
of covariates is discouraged in the social sciences in favor of direct
measurement of quantities of interest.
Admittedly, even classifying cases into these three categories of
outcomes presented difficulties.  For example, when denying an at-
tempt to pierce the veil, courts often emphasize the absence of evi-
dence sufficient to establish a veil-piercing claim, which leads to an
asymmetry in the textual content of decisions in groups (1) and (2):
denials are often summary and brief whereas veil-piercing findings
consist of lengthy applications of the doctrine to the facts of the spe-
cific cases.  Such asymmetry increases the amount of noise present in
the data, but it is not particularly problematic because we find unique
166 As the mass downloading and retention of cases violates the Westlaw and Lexis
license agreements, we utilized the free service provided by the CourtListener API, which
contains the full text of approximately 2.5 million judicial opinions in the federal and state
courts. Non-Profit Free Legal Search Engine and Alert System, COURT LISTENER, https://www
.courtlistener.com (last visited Sept. 21, 2014).  The search terms we utilized were ‘“pierc*
veil”~3 OR “disregard* corpor*”~5’, where the syntax “~x” is similar to the “w/” syntax in
Westlaw.
167 This is a significant group because many of the cases containing these terms simply
refer to the doctrines in passing without evaluating the facts in any way, or otherwise con-
tain spurious references to these words in other contexts.  By way of example, courts often
referred to the notion of “piercing” the “veil” of a petition lacking substantive claims.
168 See, e.g., Matheson, supra note 46; Oh, supra note 23. R
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factual content among cases denying veil-piercing claims in sufficient
quantity to permit us to distinguish between the two groups.
That said, we adopted a fairly generous approach to including
denials.  We coded any case as a veil-piercing holding even if the court
articulated several rationales for its rejection of a plaintiff’s motion, as
long as one of these rationales consisted of an application—however
brief—of some veil-piercing legal standard to the facts.  We treated
denials of motions to dismiss a veil-piercing claim as veil-piercing
holdings because a denial of a motion to dismiss is a legal determina-
tion that the facts, as pleaded in the complaint, are sufficient to state a
veil-piercing claim.  Similarly, appeals vacating lower court veil-pierc-
ing holdings for lack of evidence were coded as veil-piercing denials
because it reflects the opinion of the court that the evidence was le-
gally insufficient to state a claim of veil piercing.
Our methodology was as follows.  A case was coded as 1 if the
court found at least one ground to pierce the corporate veil, -1 if no
grounds were obtained, and 0 if the case merely mentioned the doc-
trine without deciding the case upon it.  The key requirement for a 1
or -1 coding is that the court applied the doctrine to the facts
(whether proven or merely pled) and rendered a legal conclusion.
The failure to plead a veil-piercing claim was coded as 0 unless the
court expressed an opinion on the viability of a veil-piercing claim on
its own initiative.  Often, plaintiffs sought to exercise personal jurisdic-
tion over a shareholder under a veil-piercing theory.  The legal stan-
dard for exercising personal jurisdiction often varied from the legal
standard for imposing liability with the latter employing the tradi-
tional doctrinal tests but the former emphasizing constitutional due
process considerations.  Cases that were rejected from a jurisdictional
standpoint purely on due process or other constitutional or statutory
grounds were coded as 0 unless the court analyzed the jurisdictional
claim under one or more substantive liability standards.
We recognize that no coding scheme perfectly captures the un-
derlying complexities presented by judicial opinions, but with respect
to the specific task of classifying opinions as veil-piercing grants/deni-
als or irrelevant, our coding scheme is relatively objective and thus
likely to lead to little variation between coders.  No other aspect of our
project depends on mechanical coding.
C. Predicting the Dataset and Verifying Accuracy
We assemble a random sample of piercing cases so that we can
apply predictive coding classifications to the remaining cases in our
dataset.  While our use of predictive coding will inevitably contain
some inaccuracies, mechanically coding every case in the dataset
would be cost-prohibitive in light of its large size.  Moreover substitut-
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ing human coding for predictive coding would introduce even greater
inaccuracy due to its subjective nature because it is impossible to iden-
tify or measure subconscious deviations between the accuracy of
mechanical coding on a large dataset.
We utilize the common predictive coding algorithm for text clas-
sification known as the naive Bayes classifier.169  The naive Bayes
algorithm reflects a probabilistic approach to classification whereby a
probability is estimated for each document being of each type (i.e., a
veil-piercing decision, a denial of a veil-piercing claim, or an irrelevant
decision), and each document is classified into the type with the high-
est probability.  The naive Bayes algorithm makes a further simplifying
assumption that the predictors are conditionally independent of each
other.170  In algebraic terms, the naive Bayes classification decision
rule is given by: argmaxc Pr(X⏐Y = c) = Ppj=1 Pr(Xj⏐Y = c) where Xj is the
jth predictor, i.e., word or phrase in a judicial opinion, X is the set of
all predictors for that opinion, Y is the opinion’s (unknown) true
type, and c is the opinion’s classified type, which is chosen so as to
maximize the probability of all the predictors in that opinion condi-
tional on that document being of type c.
It is worth discussing how the X predictors are obtained for each
opinion.  Following customary conventions for text analysis, we em-
ploy the standard content-centric approach, colloquially known as the
“bag of words” assumption, which partially disregards word order to
obtain greater precision in measuring document content.171  As one
of us has explained, the bag of words assumption means that:
[E]ach word in a document is viewed as pulled out of a hat, such
that presence of prior words has no effect on the probability of any
future word being pulled out.  This means that the content of a
document can be inferred solely from the frequency of word occur-
rence . . . .  The bag-of-words assumption is plainly inaccurate, as
language contains significant lexical structure.  The existence of
grammatical rules essentially means that some words are more likely
169 See TREVOR HASTIE ET AL., THE ELEMENTS OF STATISTICAL LEARNING: DATA MINING,
INFERENCE, AND PREDICTION 210 (2d ed. 2009); MAX KUHN & KJELL JOHNSON, APPLIED PRE-
DICTIVE MODELING 353 (2013).
170 While this conditional independence assumption is plainly incorrect, an extensive
body of literature has shown that the naive Bayes classifier is surprisingly accurate for text
classification, likely because the covariance between words and phrases is largely negligible
across a vocabulary (even if non-negligible for certain words and phrases). See, e.g., David
D. Lewis, Naive (Bayes) at Forty: The Independence Assumption in Information Retrieval, in MA-
CHINE LEARNING: ECML-98, at 4 (Claire Ne´dellec & Ce´line Rouveirol eds., 1998); Harry
Zhang, The Optimality of Naive Bayes, PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEVENTEENTH INTERNATIONAL
FLORIDA ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH SOCIETY CONFERENCE 562 (Valerie Barr &
Zdravko Markov eds., 2004).
171 See DANIEL JURAFSKY & JAMES H. MARTIN, SPEECH AND LANGUAGE PROCESSING § 19.2
(2008).  More specifically, we utilize a “bag of bigrams” model whereby we treat the order
of two-word phrases as ignorable.
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than others to follow any given word.  The inaccuracy of the bag-of-
words assumption does necessarily mean it lacks utility.  In light of
the vast size of the English vocabulary, correlations between any two
individual words . . . are likely to be extremely weak.  It is simply not
the case that two words often invariably follow each other unless
they form a common two-word phrase, which is relatively infre-
quent.  Accordingly, these correlations can be treated as largely
ignorable, i.e., they should not affect inferences as to the content of
any given document based solely on the presence of individual
words.172
Because we examine two-word phrases rather than single words, the
bag of words assumption is even more plausible, because it is even less
likely that two sets of two-word phrases will systematically follow each
other.
To generate the X predictors, we preprocess the text as is com-
mon in text analysis173 and “tokenize” the opinions by dividing the
text into one-, two-, and three-word phrases.  To understand how the
172 Joshua Mitts, Predictive Regulation, at *36 (Working Paper, 2014), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=2411816 (citing GEORGE E.P. BOX & NORMAN R. DRAPER, EMPIRICAL
MODEL-BUILDING AND RESPONSE SURFACES 424 (1987) (“[A]ll models are wrong, but some
are useful.”)).
173 We preprocess our corpus of judicial opinions by converting all text to lowercase,
removing numbers and punctuation, stemming each opinion using the standard Porter
stemmer, M.F. Porter, An Algorithm for Suffix Stripping, reprinted in KAREN SPARCK JONES &
PETER WILLET, READINGS IN INFORMATION RETRIEVAL (1997), removing a list of “stop words”
that lack substantive meaning, and stripping extraneous white space from the document.
These are standard preprocessing steps in automated content analysis to ensure that words
reflect underlying content and not merely idiosyncratic prefixes or suffixes. See Justin
Grimmer & Brandon M. Stewart, Text as Data: The Promise and Pitfalls of Automatic Content
Analysis Methods for Political Texts, 21 POL. ANALYSIS 267 (2013).
For a more extensive discussion of applying these common preprocessing steps in the
legal setting, see Mitts, supra note 172, at *30.  David D. Lewis et al., RCV1: A New Benchmark R
Collection for Text Categorization Research, 5 J. MACHINE LEARNING RES. 361, app.11 (2004)
(“SMART stopword list”).  We also supplement the stop-word list with additional words that
are specific to court opinions and convey no theoretical meaning (e.g., “court” or “cir-
cuit”), or reflect “dummy” concepts such as “alter ego” and so forth.  The full list of “stop
words” is available from the authors and will be made publicly available along with the
replication code.
While the removal of numbers and punctuation might seem straightforward, stem-
ming is less intuitive.  As one of us has explained:
Stemming refers to eliminating endings such as ‘ing,’ ‘ed,’ and ‘es’ to leave
only the core ‘stem’ of a word.  Out of all of the preprocessing steps, stem-
ming is arguably the most invasive, completing eliminating distinctions be-
tween different word forms.  Nonetheless, it is a necessary tradeoff when
conducting text analysis that is content-oriented, i.e., based on word frequen-
cies, as opposed to lexical structure.  From the standpoint of document
content, there is little distinction between ‘trade,’ ‘traded,’ and ‘trading.’
All three reflect the underlying idea of a ‘trade,’ and distinguishing be-
tween these forms would distort the analysis by treating the difference be-
tween ‘trade’ and ‘trading’ identical to the difference between ‘trade’ and
any other word.
Mitts, supra note 172, at *36 (citations omitted). R
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two-word phrases are generated, consider the sentence “We refuse to
pierce the corporate veil.”  This sentence would be transformed
(“tokenized”) into the following two-word phrases:
TABLE 2. EXAMPLE OF TWO-WORD PHRASE TRANSFORMATION
• We refuse • refuse to • to pierce • pierce the
• the corporate • corporate veil
We reduce unnecessary dimensionality by removing so-called “sparse”
terms that appear in fewer than 1% and 2% of the opinions,174 yield-
ing lists of 7,435 and 2,171 two-word phrases, respectively.  These two
vocabularies are utilized for different portions of the analysis.  The
naive Bayes algorithm is sensitive to over-fitting and performs better
with fewer phrases where each has greater predictive power.  Accord-
ingly, the 2,171-phrase vocabulary is used to classify the unlabeled
opinions, but the broader vocabulary list of 7,435 phrases is used for
the substantive analysis in subparts III.D and III.E infra.
These preprocessing steps allow us to create a document-term
matrix, in which each row in the matrix represents a discrete judicial
opinion, while the columns represent the two-word phrases.  Each cell
value is the number of times the specified two-word phrase appears in
the opinion. The co-occurrence of each two-word phrase in the opin-
ions belonging to class c empirically estimates the conditional distribu-
tion.  We apply the naive Bayes classifier to the remaining 8,380
unclassified opinions in the dataset to obtain predicted types for each
judicial opinion, i.e., a veil-piercing holding, rejection of a veil-pierc-
ing claim, and an irrelevant decision.
While it is impossible to compute the accuracy rate of the naive
Bayes classifier without mechanically coding each of the remaining
cases in the dataset, applying appropriate statistical methodologies en-
ables us to estimate the accuracy rate of the naive Bayes classifier for
the entire dataset.  The specific technique we utilize is called k-fold
cross-validation.175  Cross-validation is a resampling method whereby
the coded random sample is divided into a number of groups—
known as “folds”—generally five or ten.  A predictive model is esti-
mated on all but one of the groups (i.e., four of the five or nine of the
174 Eliminating sparse terms is a common step in automated content analysis and is
beneficial both for computational and substantive reasons.  The frequency of word occur-
rences tends to follow the so-called “Zipf ’s” law for rare events, i.e., the vast majority of
words appear in a very small number of documents. See generally M.E.J. Newman, Power
Laws, Pareto Distributions and Zipf ’s Law, 46 CONTEMP. PHYSICS 323, 327 (2005).  These
words have very little predictive power (since they do not appear across many documents)
and impose a substantial computational burden.
175 See GARETH JAMES ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO STATISTICAL LEARNING: WITH APPLI-
CATIONS IN R 176 (2013).
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ten) and then applied to the remaining group to obtain an accuracy
rate for that group.  The process is repeated for each of the groups
and the group accuracy rates are averaged to obtain an overall accu-
racy rate obtained by cross-validation.176
Statistical theory suggests that the cross-validation accuracy rate
generally will approximate the accuracy rate of the predictive model
for the entire dataset, although it may be somewhat optimistic.177  The
basic intuition behind cross-validation is that resampling the popula-
tion along five or ten groups and evaluating a model’s performance
on each subset permits making accurate inferences with respect to the
predictive performance of a model when applied to the population by
balancing the bias-variance tradeoff.  Dividing the data into the
groups “forces” the model to adapt to the inherent variation present
in the data, which is similar to estimating the model on the observa-
tions in the population lacking a known class.
We perform ten-fold cross-validation and average the accuracy
rate across the random sample that has been labeled with the type of
opinion.  To get a sense for how well the classifier performs, imagine
if we had randomly categorized each opinion into one of the three
groups, i.e., a veil-piercing holding, rejection of a veil-piercing claim,
and an irrelevant decision.  Statistical theory suggests that choosing
one of the three categories at random in a sufficiently large sample
should lead to an accurate classification approximately 33% of the
time.  Table 3 summarizes accuracy rates from one instance of ten-
fold cross-validation using our classifier along with a comparison of
merely choosing a type of opinion (-1, 0, or 1) at random for each of
these folds.
TABLE 3. TEN-FOLD CROSS-VALIDATION ACCURACY RATE
VERSUS RANDOM CLASSIFICATION
Naive Bayes Random
Classifier Classification
Fold 1 75% 36%
Fold 2 74% 32%
Fold 3 83% 29%
Fold 4 76% 44%
Fold 5 75% 38%
Fold 6 66% 27%
Fold 7 78% 30%
Fold 8 80% 44%
Fold 9 75% 37%
Fold 10 84% 35%
Average 77% 35%
176 Id. at 176–86.
177 Id. at 182–83.
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As the table shows, the accuracy rates of our classifier are significantly
higher than the expected 33% accuracy rate when the type of opinion
is chosen at random.  To estimate the variance of the accuracy rate
estimates, we perform the ten-fold cross-validation ten times, and ob-
tain an average accuracy rate of 76.62% with a standard deviation of
1.20%.  These results indicate that the accuracy of our predictive
model is consistently high compared to random classification.
D. Regressing Case Outcomes on the Text of the Opinions
After obtaining predicted outcomes for the remaining 8,380
opinions, we proceed to identify which two-word phrases have the
greatest correlation with each of the two veil-piercing outcomes, i.e.,
denial or granting of a veil-piercing claim, which are coded as -1 or 1
in our dataset.  Performing this step enables us to determine the par-
ticular phrases that predict veil-piercing decisions, and as such, we re-
strict our dataset to those opinions in which the court actually ruled
on the veil-piercing issue.  To identify these phrases, we utilize multi-
nomial inverse regression (MNIR), a form of high-dimension regres-
sion analysis specifically designed for textual data represented by the
bag-of-words form of phrase counts per document.178
We apply MNIR to the subset of the opinions coded -1 or 1, which
number 5,475 in total, to identify which of the 7,435 two-word phrases
in the larger vocabulary best predict judicial decisions to pierce or
refuse to pierce the corporate veil.179  MNIR produces a factor load-
ing “coefficient” o¨j for each phrase in the vocabulary, which represents
that phrase’s correlation with the dichotomous outcomes y, as de-
noted by our model (see Appendix).  In the following section, we ap-
ply a systematic method of grouping these phrases to render the
results more interpretable, but we first present suggestive evidence of
the superiority of our three-part taxonomy.
As a heuristic demonstration, we group the phrases into four cat-
egories, one for each of our three justifications for veil piercing dis-
cussed above, with the fourth reserved for the piercing justification
that a corporation was undercapitalized.  As we noted previously, we
filtered out conclusory phrases reflecting the veil-piercing doctrine it-
self (e.g., “alter ego”) because they provide no insight into the judicial
reasoning behind veil-piercing decisions.  As the purpose of this analy-
sis is to identify which substantive, meaningful phrases explain veil-
piercing outcomes, these conclusory terms merely constitute “noise”
because they shed no light on which substantive rationales are actually
178 For a technical overview of MNIR, see the Appendix to this Article.
179 Readers familiar with regression analysis will recognize that it would be difficult to
fit a logistic regression model to this data by maximum likelihood because the number of
predictors is so relatively high.
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driving judicial decisions.  We also eliminated random grammatical
phrases that happen to correlate with the outcome variable and, for
this heuristic demonstration, we ignore other terms that cannot be
classified into one of these four categories.  (We take a more robust
approach in the following section.)  The following table shows the top
ten phrases that predict veil-piercing decisions for each of the catego-
ries along with the magnitude of their MNIR coefficients, which re-
flects the strength of the correlation.180
TABLE 4. MNIR TOP TEN PHRASES BY CATEGORY
Statutory Scheme Misrepresentation Bankruptcy Values Undercapitalization
workmen[’s] actual fraudul[ent] truste[e] power invest[ment]
compens[ation] (1.4812) (2.1574) capit[alization]
(1.9181) (0.6871)
compens[ation] act fraudul[ent] reorgan[ize] debtor undercapit[alization]
(1.8378) induc[ement] (1.9976) failur[e]
(1.4535) (0.6785)
worker[s’] scheme defraud author bankruptc[y] amount capit[alization]
compens[ation] (1.3202) (1.8771) (0.5310)
(1.5429)
hazard[ous] individu[al] creditor chapter liquid asset satisfi[ed]
substanc[e] (1.2299) (1.7083) (0.5233)
(1.4838)
releas[e] hazard[ous] mislead[ing] statement debtor possess[ion] capit[al] asset
(1.3618) (1.2208) (1.6653) (0.5027)
hazard wast[e] fraudul[ent] transfer truste[e] avoid gross
(1.3134) (1.1225) (1.5112) undercapit[alization]
(0.3873)
cercla usc neglig[ent] debtor incur[red] oper[ating] capit[al]
(1.2566) misrepresent[ation] (1.3972) (0.3650)
(0.7960)
statut[ory] scheme misrepresent[ation] code bankruptc[y] inadequ[ate]
(0.8562) (0.7878) (1.3729) capit[alization]
0.2797
act cercla fals[e] mislead[ing] accord bankruptc[y] capit[al]
(0.8165) (0.7206) (1.3337) contribut[ion]
(0.2722)
statut[ory] intent[ional] bankruptc[y] truste[e] onl[y] asset
constru[ction] misrepresent[ation] (1.2237) (0.2085)
(0.8070) (0.5635)
Average: 1.3194 Average: 1.0696 Average: 1.6244 Average: 0.4435 
The data reflected in the table show that the coefficients for
undercapitalization are significantly lower than for the other three
theories.  In fact, the phrases that unambiguously refer to
undercapitalization—e.g., “inadequ[ate] capit[alization]” and “gross
undercapit[alization]”—are among the least likely to be systematically
180 While it might seem counterintuitive at first, we present only the absolute value of
MNIR coefficients because of the asymmetric nature of legal doctrine and judicial reason-
ing.  When courts refuse to pierce the veil, they articulate the elements of the veil-piercing
doctrine and emphasize what is missing from the facts, i.e., the facts which would have
rendered the doctrine applicable.  Similarly, when courts pierce the veil, they state which
facts weigh in favor of the decision.  Accordingly, the strongest textual predictors of veil-
piercing outcomes are the dispositive facts that courts emphasize, regardless of the out-
come of the opinions.  The weakest predictors are terms that are “random,” i.e., equally
likely to be associated with either outcome.
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associated with either outcome.  We listed all of the phrase
coefficients in an online appendix to this Article to demonstrate that
we have not selectively ignored other phrases that may be plausibly
interpreted as referring to undercapitalization.181
MNIR facilitates dimension reduction in a predictive sense, not
causal inference: the factor loading coefficients cannot be interpreted
as anything approaching a causal effect for each phrase but rather the
degree to which each phrase “absorbs” the underlying variation in
case outcomes in one direction or another.  Indeed, there is
undoubtedly substantial collinearity between the phrases, as a
paragraph or sentence by definition consists of several related words
and phrases.  More fundamentally, as we have emphasized, a veil-
piercing theory will necessarily be expressed through groups of related
words that reflect the theory’s underlying idea.  As such, any attempt
to model veil-piercing decisions causally—i.e., to identify independent
theories—must operate on the level of these ideas that give rise to the
observed text, as we discuss in the following section.
E. Discovering Theories Through Topic Modeling
The top-ten lists in the prior section represent a heuristic approx-
imation of latent modeling.  We simply grouped the two-word phrases
by their intuitive and logical link to the theory we put forward in this
Article.
A great deal of research has been dedicated to discovering latent
structure in text, which is the process of identifying the underlying
ideas that give rise to the words and phrases that we observe in docu-
ments such as judicial opinions.  In this section, we apply the tech-
nique known as topic modeling to discover the textual structure in the
judicial opinions in our dataset of piercing-the-corporate-veil cases at
the level of coherent ideas.182
Topic modeling is essentially a “mapping” of particular words or
phrases to a much smaller set of distinct ideas or particular concepts.
Mapping is probabilistic.  Each document is viewed as a weighted “mix-
ture” of topics.  Each of these topics consists of a probabilistic map-
ping of words or phrases to that topic.  For example, the three phrases
“to pierce,” “pierce the,” and “corporate veil” might be associated with
one topic with probabilities 1%, 2%, and 3%, respectively.  Docu-
181 See Jonathan Macey & Joshua Mitts, Identifying the Three Cogent Justifications for
Piercing the Corporate Veil: Online Appendix, available at http://www.joshmitts.com/piercing-
appendix.pdf.
182 Topic modeling has been used to test the validity of a constitutional theory. See
Young, supra note 165 (applying topic modeling to historical newspapers to support a con- R
stitutional law argument); see also Mitts, supra note 172, at *27, *40 (applying a form of R
topic modeling to the Wikipedia English corpus).
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ments are conceived of as “realizations” of these topics, i.e., topic 1 is
associated with a document with 5% probability, topic 2 with 10%
probability, and so forth.183
Traditional topic modeling provides a method that enables re-
searchers to discover textual “structure,” but it is somewhat incom-
plete in the context in which we are working because we are
interested not only in those terms that are most likely to belong to the
same underlying idea, but also in those terms that have the strongest
association with the outcome, as reflected by the MNIR factor loading
coefficient above.  In terms of Figure 1 in subpart III.A, we are inter-
ested not only in the vertical dimension (how tightly phrases co-occur
together and are likely to reflect the same underlying idea) but also in
the horizontal dimension (how well phrases predict veil-piercing out-
comes).  If we were to merely order the words within topics by the
strength of the topic-word association, we would lose important infor-
mation, namely, each phrase’s correlation with the judicial outcome.
Accordingly, in addition to applying topic modeling to the two-
word phrases in our dataset, for purposes of interpretation we further
“weigh” the topic-phrase probabilities by multiplying each by the
phrase’s MNIR factor loading coefficient.  This adjusts the topic-
phrase probability by the strength of each phrase’s association with
the outcome.  These adjusted probabilities are not used in the topic
modeling estimation, but are employed solely to interpret the results
in light of the predictive power of the underlying phrases.
As Table 5 shows, applying topic modeling to the dataset yields a
remarkable result: despite several meaningless “noise” terms, a three-
topic model yields terms that correspond rather precisely to the three
justifications for piercing that we articulate in this Article.  We have
listed the top twenty-five terms for each topic below and bolded the
terms particularly relevant to each theory.
183 For an algebraic presentation, see the Appendix to this Article.
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TABLE 5. TOPIC MODELING—THREE TOPICS
Topic 1 Topic 2 Topic 3
Statutory Scheme Misrepresentation Bankruptcy Values
worker[s’] compens[ation] breach contract fraudul[ent] transfer
hazard[ous] substanc[e] breach fiduciar[y] bankruptc[y] code
hazard[ous] wast[e] impli[ed] warrant[y] unsecur[ed] creditor
workmen[’s] compens[ation] employ[ment] contract fraudul[ent] convey
compens[ation] act term contract reason equival[ant]
sherman act good faith substant[ive] consolid[ation]
pension fund neglig[ent] transfer made
misrepresent[ation]
statut[e] limit[ation] confidenti[al] inform[ation] adversar[y] proceed
statement undisput[ed] enter contract propert[y] estat[e]
independ[ent] contractor limit partnership hinder delay
compens[ation] benefit[s] commerci[al] code breach fiduciar[y]
pension plan franchis[e] agreement bankruptc[y] estat[e]
trade secret sale contract actual intent
virgin island contract sale intent hinder
releas[e] hazard[ous] uniform commerci[al] delay defraud
dispos[e] hazard[ous] term agreement avoid transfer
lanham act breach warrant[y] bankruptc[y] truste[e]
public util[ity] perform contract confirm plan
natur[al] resourc[e] communit[y] propert[y] chapter truste[e]
consent order express warrant[y] uniform fraudul[ent]
unfair competit[ion] perpetr[ate] fraud ponzi scheme
cours[e] employ[ment] assign leas[e] file bankruptc[y]
benefit plan partnership agreement debtor insolv[ent] 
Out of the three justifications, upholding a statutory scheme and
promoting bankruptcy values have particularly strong, clear
representation in the topic model.  The second theory is less clear,
likely because the precise facts of misrepresentation cases can vary
substantially, leaving only terms related to a common topic (i.e.,
contract law) and key terms reflecting the misrepresentation such as
“perpetr[ating] [a] fraud” on creditors.  We have included the results
of estimating four-, five-, and six-topic models in the online appendix
to this Article, which similarly show that topics organize more or less
along the lines of the three-theory justification we posit, with
additional topics generally reflecting more nuanced distinctions
between specific types of statutory regimes.184
184 See Macey & Mitts, supra note 181, at *127.  For example, topic 1 in the five-topic R
model focuses on the income tax statute, whereas topic 4 reflects workers compensation
and ERISA statutes.
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These findings demonstrate that the ideas that co-occur within
the text of the veil-piercing judicial opinions reflect the three-
justification theory we articulate in this Article.  Moreover,
undercapitalization does not emerge as a leading set of phrases in any
of these topics.  While we expected this result in light of the very small
MNIR coefficients for the undercapitalization phrases shown in the
prior section, it is remarkable that the most natural grouping of ideas
in the text of veil-piercing decisions that have predictive power track
the theories we advance in this Article.
CONCLUSION
Scholars often claim that the inquiry into whether the corporate
form should be disregarded has become oddly separated from the
question of why the corporate form should be disregarded.  In partic-
ular, the generic justifications such as undercapitalization, failure to
observe corporate formalities, and preventing injustice offered to jus-
tify piercing are unpersuasive because they are either complete non
sequiturs or vacuous due to the fact that they are wholly conclusory.
In this Article we seek to construct a rational framework for con-
ceptualizing the circumstances in which it is appropriate and consis-
tent with sound public policy to pierce the corporate veil.  We do this
by identifying the three public policy goals that explain the reasons
why courts actually pierce the corporate veil.  Our hypothesis is that
the corporate veil will be pierced if, and only if, doing so is required
for any one of the following three reasons: (1) to achieve consistency
and compliance with the goals of a clear and specific extant regulatory
or statutory scheme such as environmental law or unemployment law;
(2) when there is evidence of fraud or misrepresentation by compa-
nies or individuals trying to obtain credit (and particularly where such
misrepresentations lead a creditor erroneously to think that an indi-
vidual shareholder of a company is guaranteeing what ostensibly is
corporate indebtedness); and (3) when respecting the corporate form
facilitates or enables favoritism among claimants to the cash flows of a
firm and thus is inconsistent with the well-established bankruptcy law
value of achieving the resolution of a bankrupt’s estate that conforms
both to contract law principles and to the priorities among claimants
established by state law.
In addition to having greater explanatory power than current the-
ories, our framework offers additional advantages over existing ac-
counts of veil piercing.  First, our three-part taxonomy distinguishes
between situations in which courts actually pierce the corporate veil
and situations in which the court does not ignore the legal form of a
business organization but decides that certain liabilities that ostensibly
are the corporation’s alone actually should be shared by others in-
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cluding shareholders and affiliate corporations.  These cases, while
they often are described as piercing cases, actually are more accurately
characterized as joint and several liability cases.  In particular, where a
court finds liability on the basis that such liability is necessary to avoid
fraud or to prevent injustice, the judge is really saying that creditors
who have been hoodwinked into thinking that certain shareholders or
affiliate entities are serving as guarantors should be able to collect
from such guarantors.  Such a finding does not mean that the corpo-
ration is a fiction or that it does not exist.  Rather it means simply that
other entities besides the corporation are responsible for some or all
of the company’s indebtedness.
Current accounts of the rationales for disregarding the corporate
form, particularly accounts that consider undercapitalization as a
grounds for veil piercing, fail to reconcile the basic tension between
the well-settled doctrine that corporations can be established for the
very purpose of avoiding personal liability and the doctrine that the
veil can be pierced to avoid injustice.  Under our account, corpora-
tions can be established for the sole purpose of avoiding personal or
corporate liability on the part of investors, but not when doing so is
inconsistent with the goals of another regulatory or statutory scheme;
when there is evidence of fraud or misrepresentation by companies or
individuals trying to obtain credit; or when respecting the corporate
form facilitates or enables favoritism among claimants to the cash
flows of a firm.
Our account is, in essence, a taxonomy of justifications for pierc-
ing the corporate veil that is consistent with the venerable adage that
corporations legitimately can be established for the sole purpose of
avoiding personal or corporate liability on the part of investors.  This
adage is deeply inconsistent with the notion that shareholders can be
held personally liable for the obligations of corporations that courts
deem to be “undercapitalized,” but it is not inconsistent with our
account.
Finally, because our taxonomy provides specific and logical justifi-
cations for veil piercing, it stands as a refutation of the assertion made
by other scholars that the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil
ought to be jettisoned.  Rather than abandoning the practice of pierc-
ing the corporate veil, the most efficient approach to this doctrine
would be for judges to determine whether piercing the corporate veil
in a particular case will achieve one of the three public policy goals
that we identify in this Article.
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APPENDIX
In this Appendix, we summarize the multinomial inverse regres-
sion (MNIR) model and provide an algebraic overview of the topic
model we utilize in the body of the Article.185  MNIR utilizes “the
inverse conditional distribution for text given yi . . . to obtain low-dimen-
sional document scores that preserve information relevant to yi ,”186
where i represents each document in the dataset.  It can be shown
that under certain weak assumptions, the inverse distribution of xi
given yi permits obtaining a sufficient reduction score zi , which renders yi
conditionally independent of xi given zi .187  These sufficient reduction
scores are obtained through a factor loading ϕj for each of the j
phrases in the vocabulary.  In algebraic terms, the model is given by:
xy = ∑i:yi = yxi for each y ∈ Y
with  for j =1, . . . , p, y ∈ Y
where each MN is a p-dimensional multinomial distribution with size
my = ∑i:yi=ymi and probabilities qy = [qy1,...,qyp]′ that are a linear function
of y through a logistic link. . . . [T]he sufficient reduction (SR) score
for fi = xi/mi is then 
188
The algebraic representation of our topic model is:
With each observation xi∈{x1,...xn} a vector of counts in p
categories, given total count , the K-topic model has
 where topics  and
weights wi are probability vectors. . . . In this context, each xi is a vector
of counts for terms (words or phrases) in a document with total term-
count mi, and each topic qK is a vector of probabilities over words.
Documents are thus characterized through a mixed-membership
weighting of topic factors and, with K far smaller than p, each wi is a
reduced dimension summary for xi .189
Document-topic probabilities are estimated by the empirical fre-
quency of words/phrases in each document and topic-word/-phrase
probabilities are estimated by the co-occurrence of words across docu-
ments. The result of topic modeling is a “natural” probabilistic map-
ping of the documents to a small number of topics and a similar
probabilistic mapping of words/phrases to documents.  The choice of
185 Matt Taddy, Multinomial Inverse Regression for Text Analysis, 108 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N
755 (2013).
186 Id. at 755.  For a thorough discussion of inverse regression, see R. Dennis Cook,
Fisher Lecture: Dimension Reduction in Regression, 22 STAT. SCI. 1 (2007).
187 Taddy, supra note 185, at 755. R
188 Id.
189 Matthew A. Taddy, On Estimation and Selection for Topic Models, in PROCEEDINGS OF
THE 15TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND STATISTICS 1184,
1184 (2012).
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which words and phrases are associated with which topic, and which
topics are associated with which documents, is made by a method simi-
lar to traditional maximum likelihood estimation: which associations
are most “likely” given the observed data.190
190 More technically, we estimate Q and W using joint maximum a posteriori (MAP)
estimation under the natural exponent family parameterization.  See id. at 1186.
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